Jamin An  

*Institutional Arrangements: The Politics of Art Museums*

My inquiry examines art’s institutional arrangements through the present character of modern and contemporary art museums. This examination is positioned initially with the postmodernist theoretical evaluation of the art museum which argues the rupture of the modernist art episteme signaled the end of the museum and the project of constructing art’s history. I limited my inquiry to museums located in major art centers across the globe, the places and spaces that have defined the sphere of twentieth century art. These museums share national and historically influential platforms. Attracting the largest, most economically diverse audiences the museums I am interested in also define best practices for the preservation, collection and display of twentieth-century and contemporary art.

The inclusion of performance art in museum collections and exhibitions allowed me to assess the museum’s space of interpretation and purported reforms since the postmodern critique. What I draw from the different strategies to include and recognize performance is a desire for a synthetic theory and method of performance collection and presentation that remains committed to the modernist foundations of museum practice. Important questions that target the arbitrary origins of these criteria and recognize the interpretive constraints on performance art remain unanswered as the museum carves a marginalized space for performance art in the institution.

The myopic strategies that do not engage museum practices in Chapter One are shaped by the postmodern criticism that locates the site of museum critique only in the image or work of art. In Chapter Two, I retrace dominant postmodernist critiques of the museum to demonstrate that an artwork-centered criticism foreclosed any possibility to fully consider the museum’s instrumentality of producing particular epistemological systems. Instead, an impetuous evaluation of the museum is put forth through a reactionary dialecticism that is constructed between modernist and postmodernist art. Postmodernist critics champion modernist negation, pointing to the dissolution of mediums through multimedia work, or the use of new production strategies like photographic reproduction. However, what is posited in this reactionary negation is an equally authoritative, unitary criterion. A commitment to a democratized, egalitarian
museum space that engenders multiple interpretive possibilities must cast a wider net and critique the structures of interpretation and visuality that underlie the museum’s conventions. Guided by performance’s proposition of an intersubjective interpretive exchange and Michel Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge, the failures of performance inclusion and the postmodern critique of museums indicate the need for critical strategies that target the local possibilities of intervention and address the constitutive acts of the museum’s discursive field. Re-examining the connections between a museum’s practices of collection, display and preservation to a particular archive or discursive regulation I close this project with the hopes of offering a new critical direction for us to shape and mold our institutional realities.

James Thomas Anderson

*Between Principles and Pragmatism: Nongovernmental organizations and competing approaches to humanitarian relief aid.*

I argue that traditional principles of humanitarianism such as humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence maintain their importance and relevance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) delivering humanitarian relief aid in contemporary crises. I also temper this with the argument that no aid agency maintains a monopoly on the most effective means by which to engage in humanitarian assistance, nor is any one particular approach objectively or *a priori* morally superior to another. Rather, the principles’ continued efficacy is dependent on context and an appreciation of the nuance in various crises.

The topic is relevant given the current international system, specifically the nature of modern humanitarian crises, and the concomitant and increasing role of NGOs in alleviating the suffering that these crises cause. Acknowledging that both humanitarian crises, and NGOs’ role in them, will remain a part of the international system for the foreseeable future, the question regarding aid becomes not so much whether to intervene, but how to do so most effectively. In attempting an answer to this question, I challenge multiple trends from recent years in policy and scholarship advocating the abandonment of traditional humanitarian principles.

I outline and elucidate the theoretical justifications for humanitarian principles, and demonstrate how we may present agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) as “ideal types” of approaches to humanitarian relief aid. Despite the agencies’ heavy rhetoric, they in fact compromise these principles and respond to crises with flexibility and initiative.

My research into contemporary humanitarian crises and the relevance of humanitarian principles looks at the ICRC and MSF primarily. I look at the relative successes of these agencies across multiple crises spanning time (from the 1980’s to the present) and geopolitical arenas (examining, *inter alia*, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Iraq).

The substantive analysis begins with a discussion of neutrality and impartiality, contrasting the discretion of the ICRC with MSF’s “witnessing” and advocacy. I then examine the
humanitarian imperative in comparing relief aid to long-term developmental approaches to aid, identifying the importance of relieving immediate human suffering before addressing root economic and political causes of conflict. The final substantive chapter examines the principle of independence, critiquing recent attempts by states to embed themselves in humanitarian action, and technical standards and accountability measures that can restrict NGOs’ flexibility.

I demonstrate that traditional principles remain vital for humanitarian NGOs providing relief aid. They facilitate access to populations, help identify the key areas of horrific suffering, allow impartial protection of human rights, and assist NGOs in maintaining suitable distance from non-neutral actors and restrictive, rigid templates for action. Importantly, however, my research highlights the fact that no one principle is objectively and wholly better than another. Humanitarian aid agencies should reconcile themselves to the continued complexity of these situations. Simone de Beauvoir has noted that ethics do not furnish recipes, and NGOs must persistently reflect on their context and capabilities to create effective humanitarian space.

**Jamelle Bouie**

*No Party but the Grand Old Party: Evangelicals, Civil Rights and why the Democratic Party Can’t Close the “God Gap”*

I argue that the current effort by the Democratic Party to close the “God Gap” in presidential elections by appealing to evangelical voters is doomed to failure. Democratic attempts to “reach out” to evangelical communities stem out of the perception that Democrats lost evangelical voters to the Republican Party and that this loss has hurt long-term Democratic viability. In turn, this perception is fueled by the narrative which gained currency following the 2004 presidential election and which has recently been popularized by journalist Amy Sullivan (and others).

In this narrative, the Democratic Party “lost” evangelicals when it failed to secure their long-term support following Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976, of which evangelicals played a significant part. According to Sullivan and other commentators, the Carter administration ignored evangelical concerns and pursued an agenda which was anathema to evangelicals. In particular, evangelical elites grew increasingly hostile to the Carter administration and the Democratic Party at large, so that when Republican politicians offered their support, evangelicals gladly obliged. For twenty years, Republican electoral dominance was built on an evangelical foundation, and as the argument goes, Democrats need to chip away at that foundation if they are to have any chance at long-term political success. To do that, Sullivan argues, Democrats need to moderate their positions and rhetoric on social issues (same-sex marriage, abortion, etc.) and conduct sustained outreach to evangelical communities, with the hope that regular contact will build familiarity and eventually, support.

This picture, however is not entirely accurate; as I argue, evangelical support for the Republican Party dates back to the 1960s, when evangelicals – a largely Southern demographic – were courted by the Republican Party on the basis of their vocal opposition to civil rights legislation. As I explain in my second and third chapters, modern evangelicalism is a
conservative religious tradition with roots in early 20th century fundamentalism and conservative Protestantism. These conservative evangelicals are concerned with defending and maintaining a divine more order, which is often defined as a more traditional, hierarchical social order. In the South, defense of Jim Crow became a part of evangelical theology, to the point where religious language is used to defend the existing racial hierarchy. In the fourth chapter, I use recent analysis to show that this combination of Southern evangelicalism and racial conservatism makes said evangelicals more likely to express racial animosity and racially conservative beliefs, and that this in turn primed evangelicals to respond enthusiastically when first Goldwater and then Nixon used racial conservatism to garner votes.

I argue that this legacy of theological conservatism and racial prejudice do more to explain the enduring bond between evangelicals and the Republican Party than do the typical list of social issues. Evangelicals became Republicans when the GOP embarked on its “Southern Strategy,” and remained Republicans as the party became a vehicle for defending the existing racial and gender hierarchies. Try as they might, the Democrats will always have trouble attracting evangelicals as long as it remains a fundamentally liberal party.

William A. Callison IV

From Radical Critique to Political Withdrawal: The Critical Theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas

This thesis explores the foundations and development of critical theory from its inception in the 1930s with Max Horkheimer to its current state in the work of Jürgen Habermas. Critical theory began as a Marxian-inspired interdisciplinary research program, which integrated philosophy and the social sciences in an attempt to aid the German workers’ movement of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). Today critical theory involves an interdisciplinary, dynamic approach to the critique of social, political and ideological structures. It has become widely influential throughout the humanities and social sciences because of the range of its analysis and the legacy of its proponents. In this thesis I examine the work of four influential members of the Frankfurt School of critical theory who have advanced this tradition in different ways.

I argue that both the “first-generation” (Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) and the “second-generation” (Habermas) of critical theory began with a radical critique of the status quo, which engaged in the social and political struggles of their respective eras. However, in the latter part of both generations, critical theory fell into either a state of despair and inaction or into a position of uncritical complacency. I show that this shift resulted in a withdrawal from critical-political activity and a temporary disbanding of the tradition and mission of critical theory. The past failures of critical theory require explanation as well as revision to properly alter its undertaking for future analysis.

I advance these arguments throughout the thesis by chronologically tracing the work of the theorists in relation to their historical circumstances. I begin with a brief political history of
the Weimar Republic to show how its turbulent environment shaped the mission of the early Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and how Weimar’s collapse necessitated the emigration of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse to America. Alongside this historical narrative I discuss the conceptual underpinnings of early critical theory and how its analysis changed in the midst and aftermath of World War II. During this bleak historical period, the theorists’ evaluation of modernity became similarly dark and pessimistic. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno launched a totalizing critique of mass culture and the “new barbarism” of Western society. Marcuse likewise presented a virulent critique of what he called “one-dimensional society.” This period left the first generation in a state of political withdrawal.

Habermas, a student of Horkheimer and Adorno who would later take over as director of the Institute, reinvigorated critical theory with his examination of the public sphere and rational-critical debate. With his theory of communicative action, Habermas shifted the paradigm to an intersubjective and linguistic social analysis. But his later work ultimately departs from the tradition of critical theory, as it gives an uncritical legitimization of current political structures.

I conclude with a critique of the later Habermas’s work. To revise critical theory, I propose three necessary elements for its future undertaking: returning to the more critical and engaged project of the early Institute; integrating Foucault’s critique of power; while retaining Habermas’s linguistic and intersubjective focus.

Patrick Casey

A Question of ‘Resolve’: The Potential for Institutionalist Theory to Improve IMF Assessment of Program-Country Reform Capacity

Argentina’s “total economic and financial meltdown” in December of 2001 has attracted attention both for the severity of the crisis and for the role of the International Monetary Fund in Argentina’s collapse. I situate this thesis within the strand of research that holds that as a result of failures in its engagement process, the IMF contributed to the intensity of the crisis. By the IMF’s decisions in January and September 2001 to lend Argentina extraordinary sums of financial support when many analysts agree the Argentine reform effort was already doomed, the IMF “only postponed the inevitable and, by raising the debt burden, also meant that the costs of the eventual collapse were all the greater.”

Empathy with the misery of the Argentine experience and fear that such a mistake could be made again have motivated researchers to analyze the economic weaknesses that contributed to the crisis, to search for indicators that can facilitate those weaknesses’ earlier detection, and to propose economic policies that could guard against similar crises in the future. I approach the project of preventing another such catastrophe from a different angle.

Before the Executive Board of the IMF will commit to loaning funds to a state beset by crisis, it must be confident in two conclusions. First, the Board must be confident that the program of economic reforms formulated in conjunction with the crisis country will put the
country back on a path to economic stability and growth, given the best economic forecasts available at the time. Secondly, the Board must be confident that local political leaders will be able to translate the policy proposals negotiated with the IMF into enforced law in the program country, so the program country can take advantage of the window of safety provided by IMF lending. In internal documents, the IMF often refers to this capacity as the country’s ‘resolve.’ I focus on this under-treated second concern.

In this thesis I will argue two points. First, I hold that the IMF’s failure to accurately assess program-country capacity to enact negotiated reforms caused it to approve loan decisions in 2001 that were at that point already doomed to fail. Secondly, I will argue that the application of an institutionalist theoretical framework has the potential to improve the IMF’s future assessment of program-country reform capacity. I support my first claim with an analysis of the IMF’s flawed assessment of Argentine ‘resolve’ in January and September of 2001. I motivate my second claim with an example of an institutionalist theoretical framework’s superior predictive power of Argentine resolve in January 2001.

Kathleen Connelly

Class Values: The Relationship between Social Class and Morality in America

Although Americans are often uncomfortable discussing social class, class differences in morality are an important if not underappreciated aspect of American culture. Thus, the primary purpose of this thesis is to empirically investigate the relationship between social class and morality in America.

In order to establish an understanding of the study of social class in America, the first chapter briefly overviews traditional aggregate class theory, its critiques, and two alternative class theories, stratification theory and microclass theory. I then present the first goal of this thesis: To identify the models and measures of class that best predict morality. Next, the second chapter reviews different psychological theories of morality to determine a working definition of morality. I use this definition to review past research on the relationship between class and morality, which generally suggest that social classes possess different moral values in terms of authoritarianism, self-actualization, work ethic, and friendship. This chapter also introduces the second goal of this thesis: To determine if class differences in morality still exist in these and other areas of morality.

After reviewing past research on class and morality, the third chapter begins the empirical study of class and morality. It presents the analyses of three nationally representative surveys, including the General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, and the World Values Survey. The analyses generally suggest that the lower classes value authoritarianism and loyalty more than the upper classes. In turn, they also suggest that the upper classes value self-actualization and fairness more than the lower classes. However, the analyses found no class
differences in work ethic. The findings not only offer preliminary evidence of small but important class differences in morality, but suggest that both the stratification and aggregate models of class successfully predict moral values.

The results of the analyses in the third chapter provided the basis for the creation of an original survey on social class and morality. As in the third chapter, the results of this Social Class Survey suggest that that the lower social classes tend to value authoritarianism more than the upper classes. They also suggest, contrary to the previous findings, that the upper classes may value work ethic more than the lower. Finally, the analyses indicate that the upper classes tend to value the individualizing moralities, such as compassion and fairness, more than the binding moralities, such as loyalty, respect for authority, and purity.

The final chapter of this thesis summarizes interprets the results of the four empirical studies, identifies the limitations of the study, and suggests paths for future exploration. Overall, the results of the analyses presented in this thesis suggest that there are, indeed, small but significant class differences in morality in present-day America: The data suggest that the lower classes value moralities that promote group unity and function whereas the upper classes primarily value moralities that emphasize autonomy and individuality. Hopefully, this thesis will help clarify the relationship between class and morality in America and emphasize the importance of class in the twenty-first century.

Marta P. Cook

Winning Back the ‘Values’ Voter: The Religious Progressive Movement and a Development of a Framework Connecting Liberals and Christian Communities

I argue that the 2004 election served as a wake-up call to Democrats, when post-election analysis showed that the more often a person went to church, the more likely he voted for George W. Bush. Many political liberals realized an enormous “God Gap” had developed between the two parties, that somehow many Christians felt that the Democratic party did not understand or represent their values.

In the first chapter, I examine the sociopolitical force of religion in America. I assess the political impact of the religiosity of this nation, from the ‘politics of belonging’ to the ‘politics of believing’. I explain how religion in America is as dynamic as it is constant, with denominational trends and ethnic demographics rapidly changing in the modern era. I evaluate how the Democrats began to understand this and to incorporate it in 2008 election strategies.

Then I outline who the current leaders of the religious progressive movement are and their outreach strategies to evangelicals and Catholics, specifically. It is essential, in understanding the loose and tenuous partnerships of this modern movement, to realize that many of the people and groups in it may be politically liberal, but still hold theologically conservative values. I will then examine the concerted faith outreach of both the Obama and Clinton presidential campaigns. I argue that the advances both of them made were crucially important in helping them build broad-based constituencies of support in unlikely places. I
provide an in-depth case study of a Democratic congressional race in Virginia that became one of the biggest upsets in the 2008 elections, partially due to the campaign’s deliberate and extensive faith outreach in one of the most conservative districts in the state.

However, it is not enough to blame Democratic policy positions or choice of candidates to run as the reasons why they almost categorically fail to connect with conservative and moderate Christian voters. The problems lie deeper. Using moral psychological analysis and studies from the cognitive science field, I argue that Democrats have systematically failed to construct a framework for modern liberalism that can reach the vast majority of moderate and conservative Christians on a moral or emotional level. It is not that Democratic issues cannot appeal to Christians, but that the Democrats have essentially given no amenable overarching framework through which Christians could locate their own values within modern political liberalism.

Lastly, I argue that Christianity can help modern liberalism better envision and articulate its conceptions of the good. I demonstrate how the predominant paradigm of “choice” in liberal politics is not only strategically crippling in terms of outreach to moderate and conservative Christians, but also captures liberals’ philosophical disconnect with religious thought in negotiating their policy positions in the public square. I call for Democrats to reclaim the virtue of personal sacrifice. Then, I identify two Christian principles—the Body of Christ metaphor and the ethic of stewardship— that help to better illuminate the moral framework behind liberal policy positions. I outline potential applications of these theological concepts to the most pressing political issues of our time, in hopes of securing liberal victories that are not only long lasting but also help to develop common ground between the party and people of Christian faith.

Jessica Haney

_Fragment and Fugue: Voices of the Postcolonial Self_

This project explores the nature of intercultural dialogue in postcolonial society. It asks how we deal with the so-called “other”—as individuals and in aggregate—and how we might learn to deal with him so that he may become less “other” and more “us.” This task promises to be one of the most defining for the present generation, perhaps even for the present century. Indeed, in this contemporary global society, such an effort becomes critical if the wheels of diplomacy and economy are to keep turning, and peaceful existence is to be passed down to our children.

The issue of intercultural dialogue is especially acute in the context of the apparent dichotomy between “east” and “west.” The us-versus-them mentality is pervasive and pernicious on both sides of this so-called cultural divide. The opposite extreme and counter-ideal is a “post-racial” society, in which self and society are no longer fragmented along lines of cultural difference. However, the ideal seems impossible, since human subjectivity is inescapable and cultural difference its inevitable byproduct.
This project attempts to ascertain how one might transcend the crippling us-them dialectic in which so many of us live. The initial task is to explore how notions of cultural unity and divide have been expressed in contemporary English literature: specifically, the poems of Canadian Caribbean Nourbese Philip and Kashmiri American Agha Shahid Ali. Next, theoretical resonances of these poems' joint insights are explored in the critical works of James Clifford, Tzvetan Todorov, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Kamau Brathwaite, and Salman Rushdie.

Based on this unique array of poets and critics read in aggregate, I conclude that the nature of the postcolonial self is fundamentally more paradoxical and complex than we tend to imagine. The discourses which polarize—those grounded in purely relativist or purely universalist mindsets—are insufficient for describing postcolonial reality. And the ideal “post-racial,” too, is insufficient. When these thinkers are put into dialogue with each other, the collective epiphany is that the post-racial can never be “post” racial; that the post-racial is by very definition racial. It is more than a mere appropriation of the “other’s” voice, and more than a mere backlash against it; and it is more than a simple creole or composite of the two. It is the contrapuntal interplay of other and self, when one’s objectivity and subjectivity are working in and through each other. We can conceive of our post-racial selves as whole fragments and fractured wholes. Dichotomy has been turned on its head but without being annihilated. Such knowledge offers a window not only into the postcolonial, but also into the post-lapsarian world. The propagation of these insights at a grassroots level has the potential, over time, to bring the transcendent racial post-racial further into being.

Laura Harris

“Seeing the Population Issue Whole:” Population Policies, Reproductive Rights, and Demographic Goals

For most of the 20th century, demographic perspectives formed the impetus and framework for most population policies worldwide. Some of these policies viewed women as merely ‘targets’ for contraception and resulted in human rights violations such as involuntary sterilization. In 1994, the International Conference on Population and Development resulted in a much needed global shift towards women’s rights and reproductive health as focuses of population policies. Yet this shift has also largely excluded demographic perspectives from mainstream population policies and discourse, which is worrisome because current global population growth and size are key factors that make our relationship with the earth unsustainable. I argue that policymakers must take into account both human rights perspectives and demographic perspectives in order to formulate population policies that are ethical and effective.

Demographic perspectives provide population policies with a focused, explicit goal: global fertility should be reduced to replacement rates or below as a necessary part of efforts to decrease environmental impact and improve human and environmental wellbeing. Yet these perspectives by themselves are incomplete as foundations for population policies because they provide little direction regarding methods of achieving fertility reduction. Past associations
between demographically driven policies and human rights abuses should serve not as a condemnation of all demographic perspectives, but as a cautionary tale that emphasizes the importance of combining human rights perspectives with demographic perspectives.

A human rights perspective adds several important dimensions to population policies: it helps to refocus policies on the individuals they affect, and emphasizes the ultimate end of fertility reduction – the wellbeing of people through sustainability, health, and development. In many settings, a human rights approach has lowered fertility simply by rendering reproductive choice meaningful. Yet even when supplemented by concepts of global justice, including distributions of burdens, procedural justice, and reproductive responsibility, a rights-based perspective leaves population policies with so broad a mandate that they can become unfocused, and it casts fertility reduction as an added benefit rather than a central goal. When combined with a demographic perspective however, human rights can be a powerful orientation for population policies.

In order to link human rights and demographic perspectives, I propose policy strategies such as ad campaigns that influence the architecture of reproductive choices without limiting or unduly burdening these choices. These strategies are “nudges,” in the terminology of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. I provide case studies of policies consistent with nudges in Iran and Kenya, and I argue that these nudges can enlarge a human rights approach to embrace demographic focus.

Human rights and demographic perspectives are complementary in that they both contribute to more ethical and more effective population policies. On a deeper level, their synergy lies in a collaborative approach to population policies, which seeks to involve all people in making conscious reproductive choices with an eye to both their wellbeing and the wellbeing of society. There are some tensions between the two perspectives; the kinds of strategies each emphasizes most strongly vie for funding, and on a theoretical level, each seeks to reduce the other to merely a means to achieve its own ends. These tensions, however, show even more strongly that neither perspective is comprehensive, or sufficient. We need to employ both perspectives when thinking about population policies.

Within southern Sudan, President Nimeri’s actions and the subsequent loss of southern autonomy provided an opportunity for southern rebels to band together and create the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In Chapter Three, I discuss the situation within southern Sudan, and how this situation was conducive to a future rebellion. The abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement provided southern rebels with an opportunity to begin this rebellion. The SPLA formed around the idea of an inclusive southern identity; instead of banding around a single ethnic group, SPLA leaders attempted to create a minimum-winning coalition of diverse ethnic groups in the region so as to become the main resistance group in the southern region, and to be victorious against the national army. While the SPLA focused on common southern grievances, individuals joined the SPLA because of the opportunities that this army provided.

Andrew J. Macklin
Speaking of Faith: Justifying Charitable Choice in the Public Forum

This paper presents Charitable Choice as a subject of public discourse. It answers the questions that might be raised in this discourse: What is Charitable Choice? Should political liberals accept it? Would its implementation produce impermissible outcomes or effects? Why should religious NGOs agree to partnerships with the state? And finally, why should Christians consent to participate in this fictional policy discussion?

First, Charitable Choice argues for government neutrality towards religion—the state may neither promote nor inhibit religion. In particular, it applies this principle to government funding of NGOs. The state may set certain criteria by which it chooses which NGOs to fund; however, religion cannot be a factor in these criteria. I examine Charitable Choice within the framework of public reason, which legitimates laws that are supported by a reasonable political conception of justice. The political value of fairness supports Charitable Choice’s proposal of government neutrality towards religious organizations; as long as they achieve valid public purposes, religious organizations should be able to partner with the state.

Political liberals will object to Charitable Choice if the policy has the effect of impermissibly promoting religion or fostering excessive entanglement between church and state. I argue that Charitable Choice emphasizes the expectation of good-faith compliance as a critical part of the government’s relationship with its citizens. It sets down specific standards that will help preserve distinct spheres of influence for church and state, and expects that citizens will, in good faith, comply with these standards to minimize impermissible unintended effects.

Similarly, religious NGOs object that partnerships with the state may dilute their religious mission, diminish their organizational autonomy, or impose restrictive bureaucratic standards. Charitable Choice responds in two ways. First, I urge religious citizens to focus more on positive social outcomes than on the integrity of their methods. Second, I invoke a moral imperative that implies that religious individuals have an obligation, as citizens, to partner with the state if it will increase the effectiveness of their efforts.

Finally, religious citizens object to the framework of public reason under theological conceptions of the church in contestation or opposition to the political world. I respond with a theology that places the spiritual and political worlds—and their correspondent vocabularies—under God’s sovereignty, so that participation in public reason is a spiritual act. I conclude that a religious citizen may introduce Charitable Choice into the public political forum because it makes properly political arguments that should lead reasonable citizens to accept it.

Gautam Malhotra

Neo-Liberal Capitalism & the Relative Perspectives of Globalization: The Cosmopolitan Elite and the Lower Socio-Economic Class
I argue that the structural limits of neo-liberal capitalism result in vertical and horizontal polarization, leading, in turn, to distinctly contrasting class perspectives on globalization. Following from this distinct perspective, people in lower socio-economic classes use democracy to challenge neo-liberalism. I contend that with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the internet revolution, a seamless global economy has been created. This has proliferated corporate expansion, giving the rise to a new cosmopolitan elite class. Closely tied to transnational production networks, this class has been the greatest economic beneficiary of neo-liberal capitalism.

Neo-liberal capitalism has resulted in vertical polarization; I define this as the rising disparity of wealth between the transnational elites and lower socio-economic populations. The transparency of the cosmopolitan elite class’s social positioning, establishes them as the dominant class. I argue that this generates a cosmopolitan elite ideology that assumes cultural ‘synchronic pluralism.’ Reflective of neo-liberal capitalism, this implies a mixing of cultural materials across boundaries. I will argue that the ideology of nationalism, which understood the world to be organized in fixed enclosed bodies, such as nation-states, is being replaced by this cosmopolitan discourse. Through consumerism, this seeps into the middle class.

The decline of nationalism and state welfare creates a different perspective on globalization within lower socio-economic classes. Left feeling abandoned by the state, they have turned to their sub-national identities to reclaim their sense of belonging, and to make stronger claims on the remaining available state resources. This phenomenon is called horizontal polarization. One problem with Friedman’s model of vertical and horizontal polarization is it suggests that the lower socio-economic class continues to be marginalized, assuming the position that the lower socio-economic class remains helpless under neo-liberal capitalism.

I use Foucault’s theory of ‘governmentality’ to argue that new government technologies, serving as population measurement tools, shift the modern state’s governing methods. Now, governing is more scientific, focused on the objective finalities of measures, such as lowering poverty levels, raising employment, etc. Instead of governing civil society members, governments now govern populations, who are individuals of society who may live outside the law. I argue that this shift potentially empowers lower socio-economic classes, which can exercise the democratic right to vote, and keep governments more accountable to them.

To demonstrate how ‘governmentality’ has empowered the marginalized lower socio-economic class, I provide the example of the Texas Colonias population. By mobilizing and building a political network with several NGOs, state politicians, and the media, they were able to influence the passing of the 1989 Economically Distressed Areas Program legislation.

My research shows that several marginalized populations, especially in developing countries, have successfully altered their government’s neo-liberal economic policies. These examples, I argue, cast doubt on post-Cold War claims of democracy and neo-liberal capitalism as a “natural” pairing. Rather, marginalized populations are using democracy to participate in process of shaping their own systems.
Bernice Denira Ramirez

Hope is Not Enough: the High Stakes of Immigration Reform and the Obama Administration

Immigration reform has been long awaited. To the frustration of many groups, the 109th Congress was in 2006 unable to come to a compromise. But reform remains critical for several reasons. The first concerns the historically large, and growing, number of immigrants to coming to the United States—both legal and illegal. But “illegal immigrants” pose the greatest challenge for reformers. Current estimates show that the undocumented population is the highest it has ever been. Reform that does not address the fate of this group will be incomplete. A second reason to enact reform concerns the changing relocation patterns of these immigrants, with many settling in areas with little or no history of immigration. The changing geography of immigration has pressured local and state governments to enact harsh policies targeting immigrants. Similarly the failure of immigration reform caused the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to step up enforcement of existing policy instead.

Although the need for reform is clear, the goals and methods of the direction immigration policy should take are severely contested. This thesis examines obstacles Barack Obama is likely to face if he chooses to reform immigration policy. The central question of this thesis is: what are Obama Administration’s prospects for immigration reform? To answer it, I review the evolution of immigration policy from the turn of the 20th century to the 9/11 events. Then I identify the central axis of the immigration debate and the actors advocating competing policies. Next, I explore the failure of comprehensive immigration reform efforts in 2006 and 2007 and the lessons they teach. Finally, I detail Obama’s own political approach and evaluate his ability to bridge the divides immigration creates.

In the past, immigration legislation has been very difficult to enact. Restrictionists have formed a vocal, cohesive front against immigration. Ultraconservatives like CNN anchor Lou Dobbs and Rep. Tom Tancredo opposed a path to legalization, claiming any option was “amnesty” regardless of what shape it took. The Democrats, on the other hand, found it difficult to sell their more complex “comprehensive” immigration reform plan to voters. In the end, ultraconservatives were able to build coalitions that pro-immigrant groups were not.

As applied to immigration reform, the notion of bipartisanship is more vacuous than usual. Some believe that the “pragmatic” Obama, emphasizing solutions over ideology, can bridge the rifts that comprehensive immigration creates. In contrast, I draw from the immigration debate in 2006 to show that immigration creates strife that makes middle ground difficult to achieve. Obama may be willing to cede some ground on the issue by protecting immigrants’ rights but also allowing the massive wall between Texas and Mexico to be built; but, for many reasons, most ultraconservatives are unlikely to accept this type of compromises.
Ultimately, I argue, the political costs of immigration reform are too high for the Obama administration to achieve a meaningful change in policy.

Immigration is highly contentious and not a winning issue for Democrats. That is the primary reason why reform is not likely to happen during Obama’s first term. Besides the difficulty of compromising over the issue, Obama has a long list of other major policy issues will almost certainly trump immigration. Obama would lose too much political capital if he were to take on immigration: he would alienate important groups in return for small political gains.

Jordan Rodakis

*Baby Did a Bad, Bad Thing: Fantasy and Power in Girls Gone Wild*

*Girls Gone Wild*, the pop culture powerhouse and brainchild of 35-year-old millionaire Joe Francis, is an increasingly popular form of sexualized entertainment. The company produces films that show “real college girls” bearing their bodies for the camera. As a medium, *Girls Gone Wild* can be defined as neither pornography nor reality film (documentary or otherwise). Its unique elements of coercion and contrivance set it apart from standard conventions of pornography, and as such, it is the leading example of the new phenomenon that author Ariel Levy calls “raunch culture.” *Girls Gone Wild* is a new, yet pervasive, vehicle for patriarchal oppression that presents a distinctly dangerous threat to the goals of feminism.

The films and the company itself are widely recognizable for their style—which, I shall argue, amounts to coercion and manipulation of young women. The males behind the cameras of *Girls Gone Wild* play a central role in the branding of the company because the crew also serves as directors and coercers. I use transcripts from the films to illustrate the tactics the filmmakers employ to exploit the young women they target. I explore the concepts of sexual deviance, performance, coercion, and fantasy so that I may further reveal how the producers of *Girls Gone Wild* films—and the men who enjoy them—capitalize on the humiliation and degradation of women.

I utilize *Girls Gone Wild* as a case study to analyze larger patriarchal influences on male fantasy—and how those influences situate women and men as adversaries in sex and sexuality. By basing my analysis in the feminist tradition, I can identify sexist structures within this franchise and deconstruct its power. In so doing, I attempt to illuminate why this new surge in raunch culture’s popularity threatens the human dignity of both women and men.

Allison Lorraine Scott

*From Integration to Reconciliation: Christian Theology as a Resource for Racial Reconciliation*
This thesis proposes that Christian theology provides particular resources for bridging the social, cultural, economic, and religious divides that exist between black and white Americans living in a racialized society. Despite this claim, the Christian Church has often been silent and even complicit in perpetuating racial injustices and divisions within the American story. This thesis argues that this inconsistency is the manifestation of a serious error in theology within the American Church. It seeks to address this error by arguing that racial reconciliation, understood to be the act of creating new social spaces where the divisions of race are no longer the primary determinants in human relationships, is essentially related to Christian discipleship. Further, it presents examples from the Civil Rights Movement and emerging local movements as lived illustrations of the profound power and relevance of Christian theology for cultivating reconciliation and promoting social justice.

Chapter One provides a foundation for understanding Christian theology as a resource for racial reconciliation. This chapter seeks to challenge the mentality pervasive in American church culture—particularly among white evangelicals—that social problems are not to be the concern of Christians or the Church as a whole. In response to this mentality, this chapter presents a variety of elements present within Christian theology that create and affirm movement towards racial reconciliation.

Chapter Two connects these theological foundations with their expression within the story of the American Civil Rights Movement. In the midst of the contrasting struggles towards and against integration emerging in the 1960s, and still continuing in modern American society, theology has played an essential role in guiding many who have sought to live out a vision for racial reconciliation that included but surpassed the goal of legal integration. This chapter focuses on the rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movement, examining sermons and speeches given during this turbulent time in American history which contained theological arguments in support of integration and, ultimately, reconciliation. These words were the “weapons” of the non-violent movement against the powerful forces of segregated society. The voices offered in this chapter are voices of dissent, resisting the status quo and presenting alternatives based in theology to the social evils of injustice and racism particularly pervasive in the South.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five serve as a series of case studies examining particular modern organizations which have experienced some expression of racial reconciliation and were also founded on principles from Christian theology. All three present different but related models for the creation of alternative social spaces of reconciliation within the surrounding culture. Further, all these movements in some way participate in the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement and therefore reflect some of the implications of that movement for directing subsequent Christian social justice and reconciliation movements.

The conclusion to this thesis seeks to locate these reconciling movements within the broader context of the surrounding culture and examines the role that they play as models of alternate social spaces. It further explores the possibilities and limitations of theology for producing change in a racialized society.
Sidharth Sethi  
*Seeing the State and Civil Society from the Mumbai Slum*

This thesis concerns itself primarily with the politics of the Mumbai slum. I argue that the politics of the slum can best be understood by developing the concepts of state and civil society. The projects of nation building, modernity, development, and globalization, though, are not far and circulate throughout the paper.

The state today faces considerable pressure to reduce its size, scope and engagement within society. These pressures stem from the dissatisfaction with the state as a conduit for development and democratic representation. Civil society is put forward as an associational, grassroots, and usually apolitical alternative to the state.

I will first ground the state and civil society in India, and assert, generally that a) despite the pressures it faces, the state and its institutional arms are deeply embedded into local, everyday practices, and b) civil society exists in many forms in India, and cannot easily be separated from the state. From a similar premise, Partha Chatterjee argues that marginal groups compete for resources and recognition in “political society.” Civil society is constituted by citizens, i.e. the holders of substantive rights. Marginal groups are denied substantive rights, and their ability to engage the state is a function of the size of their vote-bank. I argue that political society and civil society may be simultaneously applicable to the slum.

But first, I attempt to *show* Dharavi, Mumbai’s largest slum using pictures and descriptions from newspapers, magazines, and literature. I highlight the negatively normative position that informs the urgent imperative for development. My purpose is to ‘un-den[y]’ the slum, and suggest it is not a space locked in a pre-history of under-development. I then return to the civil society/state paradigm and argue that political society has now found ways to rally citizen groups/elites and slum dwellers around the same cause of development. This has been achieved by using a market-based strategy for redeveloping the slum. At the same time, other civil society organizations, most notably, the Alliance, are finding new ways to engage the state, assisted by a federalized or an internationalized apparatus. Arjun Appadurai claims that these groups deliver “deep democracy” in the slum. I offer a more circumspect look at some of what they have done in the slum, and suggest that political and civil society will coexist in the slum.

Hamza Shaban  
*Closer to Conversation: Freedom, Objectivity, and the New Media Environment*

As new media outlets and technologies present themselves, traditional sources of news are being crowded out. Americans once received much of their information from the three broadcast networks, NBC, ABC and CBS, but novel outlets like cable TV, news websites and blogs are
decentralizing the media landscape. Whereas many fear the loss of concentrated news-gathering and wide viewership, I argue that the changes we see in the media are democratically useful as they enhance civic participation and cultivate freedom of expression.

This thesis explores the transforming media environment and grapples with the consequences of recent structural change. Beginning with the Progressive Era, I trace the development of the institutions and standards that have come to define the modern mass media. This is done by discussing the political theory of Walter Lippmann. As a skeptic of the knowledge of the American citizenry, Lippmann argued for an elite driven news media. Because citizens are incapable of informing themselves, professional journalists and their specialized bureaucracies would decide what was newsworthy. They alone would have the power to disseminate this information. In Lippmann’s conception, so long as journalists adhere to the norms of objectivity and fairness, their democratic obligations as news-gatherers would be fulfilled. Because Lippmann’s views have come to dominate our cultural imagination, he acts as a spokesman for the modern media, the Progressive media regime. He works well as a starting point because the changes we notice in the media environment are changes away from Lippmann’s vision of the free press.

After describing the type of news that emerged during the Progressive Era, I offer a rebuttal to Walter Lippmann. This comes in the form of pragmatist theory, articulated by John Dewey and Richard Rorty. While these men see Lippmann’s claims about citizen competence as empirically correct, they argue that this need not be so. Rather than appoint an elite class of specialists to compensate for citizens, Dewey and Rorty want to work harder to better educate the public. Pragmatists also reject the norm of objectivity. Where Lippmann and the Progressives believed that objective reporting would lead to an approximate truth, pragmatists would rather cultivate free and open discussion—leaving truth to be created through deliberation. By tracing the objectivity norm through history, I reveal its conceptual weakness and its practical failings in journalism.

Once the pragmatist theory is outlined, I argue that Dewey and Rorty would welcome new forms of media that have emerged in the last few decades. I focus specifically on a new type of journalism that abandons objectivity, found in *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*, as well as a new medium that enhances participation and weakens elite control of the news, the blogosphere. Using these two outlets, I illustrate the new media’s capacity to cultivate freedom of expression and reveal the shortcomings of the Progressive media regime. This thesis reflects on concentrated corporate ownership, the media’s deference to government, and of the fracturing and polarizing effects of decentralized news.

Manal Tellawi

*Roadblocks to Palestinian Statehood: An Examination of U.S. Attitudes Towards Palestinian Self-Determination*
I trace and analyze the evolution of U.S. attitudes towards Palestinian self-determination, and the effects of U.S. policies on the creation of a Palestinian state. I begin by establishing the international legitimacy of the Palestinian claim to self-determination, by tracing the history of various UN resolutions. Because the Palestinians’ conception of what would constitute a true realization of their right to self-determination has evolved over the past sixty years, I focus on the claim made by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1988, calling for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and a capital in East Jerusalem.

My main argument is that the U.S. has worked, in numerous ways, to oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. At the root of this opposition is the assumption that supporting the nationalist aspirations of the Palestinian people detracts from the U.S.’s special relationship with Israel. There are four main reasons behind the U.S. support of Israel—the Israel lobby, the perception that Israel is a strategic asset to the U.S., the sense of a moral duty in the U.S. to support the Jewish state, and the fact that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East.

My analysis begins with the First Intifada, or popular Palestinian uprising, which generated an immense amount of international and domestic pressure on the U.S to change its policy of neglect towards the Palestinians. The Palestinians won their right to sit at the negotiating table with the U.S. and Israel and a peace process commenced. However, the U.S. was not an honest broker because of the nature of its relationship with Israel. I compare and contrast the U.S. relationship with Israel and the Palestinians, in terms of military, financial, and diplomatic support to prove this point.

My thesis is subsequently divided into two parts: the Clinton era and the Bush era. Despite the beginnings of the Oslo peace process, the Clinton era remained characterized by an opposition to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. The Oslo peace agreements did not mitigate the effects of the occupation on the Palestinians, and were more favorable to Israel and less conducive to the creation of a Palestinian state. However, the Clinton administration managed to break the taboo on the concept of Palestinian statehood in 2000 with the Camp David summit. I argue that Ehud Barak’s proposal fell short of what would constitute a true realization of Palestinian self-determination, because if implemented, it would not have created a viable, contiguous, and independent Palestinian state.

The Bush administration inherited a failed peace process and a region plagued by turmoil and Israeli-Palestinian violence. I analyze the effects of 9-11 and the War on Terror on the U.S. perceptions of the Palestinians. The U.S. advocated for the creation of a Palestinian state, but it also disengaged from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and allowed Israel to induce drastic changes in the occupied Palestinian territories, such as the construction of a barrier/fence through the West Bank and the unilateral disengagement from Gaza. Israel’s actions, which were supported and enabled by the U.S., had the effects of undermining the sincerity and legitimacy of the PA in upholding the cause in the eyes of the Palestinians. Thus, I argue that U.S. policy contributed to the factionalism in Palestinian society, as well as the prolonging of the current humanitarian and economic crisis in the Gaza Strip.
Jia Angeli Carla Tolentino

*Here Is Not Merely a Nation: Writing the New American Dream*

Recognizing that the American Dream has many implications, I identify its fundamental promise as opportunity for all. This is the root of our history of immigration, and the reason why the melting pot and the American Dream are intertwined myths. Tracing the history of American immigration, I show that the Immigration Act of 1965 marked our largest step towards fulfilling this central promise, and explain why post-1965 America poses such a challenge to old ideologies. I posit that the current American Dream necessitates transnationalism, and moreover, that this is the telos of the original rhetoric: an American-ness defined by plurality, but powerful enough to transcend difference.

I use contemporary immigrant literature as my subject. I identify the latest wave of immigrant authors as uniquely positioned to examine the old American Dream against the complex realities of life in the U.S. today. They have rejected assimilationism in the traditional sense, yet they are committed to our myths in the name of equalizing and redefining our conceptions of American identity. They simultaneously affirm and destabilize national ideology, a dialectical process that casts away nativism and allows the essential promise of opportunity to emerge. To illustrate these dynamics, I examine three elements of the American Dream in contemporary literature: love of country, self-reinvention, and material success.

In the first chapter, Chang-Rae Lee’s *Native Speaker* shows Henry Park as a second-generation American whose love of country is fractured by feelings of alienation, and who consequently becomes obsessed with the fantasy of the trans-nation. Guided by Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage, I explore the displacements and projections of Henry’s cathexed obsession, showing that the America he imagines is valuable (if his method is not). The trans-nation is an “orthopaedic” fantasy—strong enough to guide the work for change.

In the second chapter, I use Gish Jen’s *Mona in the Promised Land*, Junot Diaz’s *The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao*, and Bharati Mukherjee’s *Jasmine* as updates of the immigrant bildungsroman, examining the idea of self-reinvention as a way to establish American subjectivity. In these three novels, the protagonists adopt odd, paradigmatically American identities, forcing the reader to rethink ideas of the hyphenated-American subject and of the American subject as well.

In the last chapter I address the idea of material success as the ultimate measure of happiness/Americanness—specifically, in the way it affects the “model minority,” itself a nativist concept predicated on materialism. In focusing on the rich, unhappy second generation, Jhumpa Lahiri’s three works (*Interpreter of Maladies*, *The Namesake*, and *Unaccustomed Earth*), are studies of the dangers of this American idea of success as it has become applied to the uniquely positioned Indian techno-migrants and their children.

I conclude that the authors write from a new subject position—that of an American whose “otherness” has already been incorporated—and this leads and allows them to inhabit the
discourse and then, to change it. Acknowledging the value of post-exceptionalist thought, I reject, as do these authors, the idea that we should (or can) fully discard the conception of America as endowed with unique opportunities. Rather, the work of this contemporary literature is to challenge the fallacious aspects of the American Dream so that its core might emerge strengthened.

Matthew Trumbo-Tual

*Education and the problem of assimilation: The subversive tradition of French literature*

As one of modern society’s most important cultural institutions, schools help to assert and reproduce the dominant cultural framework and its canon. This puts them at odds with writers who want to disrupt cultural norms and the reproduction of the status quo. The tension between writers and schools is particularly apparent in France, where schools have incorporated many writers who attack cultural norms into the curriculum. This seems at first like an attack on writers that emasculates their radical potential.

I argue the problem of assimilation rests on a faulty understanding of writers as autonomous from the dominant cultural framework. I show French schools assert both emancipative and oppressive values. By drawing on the former, experimental and avant-garde writers resisted French schools’ performative use of literary texts as evidence of the legitimacy of cultural and political norms defined by the state. Now, French schools approach texts as distinct parts of reality with their own ways of being influenced by and influencing their context. Although this change in schools’ approach to literature may not have had a revolutionary impact on society, it does have a subversive function in that it destabilizes the naturalization of the worldview asserted by schools as unified, self-evident and unchangeable.

Quynh Vu

*Neoliberalism and Education: How Americans Misappropriate the Free-Market Model*

I argue that Americans have misappropriated the tools and models of free-market competition by using them in the education system. This misappropriation, starting in the early 1980s with the rise of neoliberalism and continuing in the present day, has implications in the classroom; it transforms political relationships and responsibilities into mere economic transactions.

Using David Labaree’s typology of the three models of education: democratic equality, social efficiency, and social mobility, I describe the historical debate of the goals of schooling.
That these goals are not inherent in the definition of schooling, but, rather, are shaped by the social and economic forces of each era suggests that the current model of neoliberal education is not a given but is the result of political currents.

I document economic stagnation and faltering test scores as factors that led, in the 1980s, to the outcry of a failing US school system. Education discourse (including government publications, legislation, conferences, speeches) since the 1980s reveal the systematic use of free-market models as ways to conceptualize the education system. The business-like model of accountability (high-stakes testing), efficiency (decreased funding), and standardization (learning objectives) led schools to adopt new norms and goals that delimited the curriculum and reconceived pedagogy to look more like production in a factory than teaching in a classroom. The effect is a highly individualized, competitive, neutral, and consumerist education. I suggest that these changes have implications outside the classroom as well; they foster an atomized society, based in economic relationships and devoid of feelings of civic duties.

I find problematic not only the negative effects of the accountability and standardization model but also the inappropriate use of these models in the public education system. I analyze the criticisms that began in the 1980s of schools as the culprit for a stagnating economy and faltering test scores and conclude the labor market, population growth, and increased immigration account for more of these changes. I then highlight the differences between teaching/learning and working/producing and argue that implementing factory production mechanisms deprives schools of creating an educative environment. Further, I find significant incongruities between assumptions of the free-market model of firms and the realities of the education system; these disparities demonstrate that the model of free-market competition cannot be properly applied to realm of education.

Reforms, while difficult to implement and sustain, are possible. I analyze several reforms that challenge the certain assumptions of neoliberal education. I conclude that we must do more than react and counteract to the political ebb and flow; rather we must proactively re-imagine schooling. If we limit our debates on educational reform to questions of how schools can create economic growth or national security, we will only reproduce our current world. Instead, I posit that schooling should remake the world. Schools can be more than a product of social change; schools should be a lever for it.

Melissa Batchelor Warnke

Deconstructing the Memorial Museum: A Critical Analysis of the Intersection of Global Conventions and Local Healing in Post-Genocide Rwanda

This thesis will examine the competing practices of memorialization of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that have emerged in the past fourteen years. The Rwandan people have chosen to remember these traumatic and divisive events in a myriad of complex ways, from preserving sites of mass killing as they were at the end of the genocide, bodies still where they fell, to holding
commemoration ceremonies, whether annually in the national soccer stadium or weekly in local churches, to sharing testimonies. At the same time, the international community has also become involved in the memorialization process in much more abstracted and alien ways. As Rwanda’s economy and infrastructure were devastated by the genocide, external donors were invited in to assist with the completion of these “national” memorials. The resulting global memorials, copied and pasted from a UK-based Holocaust structure, fail in several ways to recognize how memory is processed and maintained on the ground in Rwanda.

Using primary research based on personal visits to dozens of locally-constructed and maintained genocide memorials, I will outline the local paths for remembrance in this wounded political community. I will then move to a critical analysis of the international design process and implementation of the Kigali Memorial Centre and, to a lesser extent, the Murambi Centre. This part of the thesis will focus upon how a standardized “international memorial museum” has emerged and what it looks like, complete with weekly survivor testimonies, symbolic gardens and naming walls, personal in styling but conventional and didactic in effect.

While the processes surrounding memorialization are rife with conflict, these local memorials are largely focused upon physical suffering and the preservation of ruined buildings and mutilated bodies as they were at the end of genocide. The fear present in these spaces recreates what it was to be in Rwanda at that time. To this end, the “education” they provide about genocide is embodied and experiential, inherently personal; they are whatever the visitor or survivor makes of them. The international productions at Murambi and in the Gisozi district of Kigali, alternately, tell the story of genocide in Rwanda linearly, using the organized information to come to standardized conclusions about abstracted humanistic values. They build bridges between what happened in Rwanda and genocides in other countries, sketching out a legal conception and framework of “genocide” as a crime against humanity, condemned and actionable under international law. That is to say, they focus not upon the land and people as sources of memory in and of themselves but frequently, in an attempt to use the museum as a tool for reconciliation, appropriate the trauma as representative of a larger sociopolitical problem to be solved.

Memory, truth and politics are not separate phenomena but are intricately intertwined and frequently appropriated for each others’ purposes, relative and circular elements. I argue that the way in which these global conventional memorials reproduce an abstracted construct for the relation of traumatic memory creates a forum for reconciliation and remembrance that is, at worst, irrelevant to the community in which this trauma was experienced and, at best, reduces the depth of their experience. Having examined and interrogated several of the current avenues for memory that exist in Rwanda, I will recognize the successful aspects of both local and global memorials and consider how these might be integrated and enhanced as communities in Rwanda seek to acknowledge and reconcile the losses they have experienced.
Christian West

Branquemento: The Myth of Racial Democracy and Color-Blind Racism in Brazil

This thesis focuses on the role of the myth of racial democracy in the formation of Brazilian national identity, racial categories, and Black social movements. It discusses why the idea that Brazil’s multiracial population purportedly lives in racial harmony has persisted despite colonization, slavery, and evidence of racial prejudice against Blacks. I argue that the myth of racial democracy rewrites colonization as historically and contextually irrelevant and legitimates white privilege in the emergence of the modern state. At a time when Brazil was in need of a unifying national identity, the myth of racial democracy was able to offer the Brazilian elites an answer to the “negro problem” while also concealing White hegemony. The idea of racial exceptionalism, the commonsense belief that Brazil is a society without racial antagonisms and is more racially and culturally accommodating, has become the very basis of the endurance of the racial democracy myth.

This thesis will explore this issue through three main questions: Why and how was the image of Brazil as a racial democracy created? Why and how did the government adopt this image and ingrained it into governmental institutions? How has the myth of racial democracy precluded Black social movements from political mobilization to prevent its endurance? I argue that Brazil’s ideology of a racial democracy devalues and prevents the identification of racial subordination needed to sustain an effective antiracist movement. The stronghold created by its commonsense adaptation has left the entrenched racial hierarchy of white privilege and non-white subordination created through colonialism unchallenged. In turn, this has perpetuated a system of “color-blind racism” that has complicated the aspects of nonwhite identity and precluded the effectiveness of social movements. I argue for a re-reading of Brazilian race relations with the importance and gravity of the residual effects of colonialism at its center.