Suppose one were to argue as follows: ‘This thing is the Father; this thing is the Son; therefore, the Son is the Father.’ It seems as good an inference as possible. And no other precisely analogous counterexample can be found in all the world.

—Robert Holcot (d. 1349), Quodlibet 1, q. 2

I believe in the Holy Trinity. So I believe that there are three divine persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—and one God. Now the mere claim that there are three of one thing and one of another is logically unproblematic. After all, there is no problem with the claim that, for example, there are three musketeers and one Eiffel Tower. But the Doctrine of the Trinity says more than just that there are three divine persons and one God. It seems to say that each of these three persons is this one God. And so it seems to imply that each person is the same God—the one and only God—as each of the others.

Thus the Athanasian Creed:
...there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit...the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Spirit is God. And yet there are not three Gods, but one God.

So the Doctrine of the Trinity involves something like the following:

(1) The Father is a person, the Son is a person, and the Spirit is a person.

(2) The Father is not the same person as the Son.

(3) The Son is not the same person as the Spirit.

(4) The Spirit is not the same person as the Father.

(5) The Father is the same God as the Son.

(6) The Son is the same God as the Spirit.

(7) The Spirit is the same God as the Father.

There is more to the Doctrine of the Trinity than (1) through (7). (For example, (1) through (7) are silent on Who proceeds from Whom.) Nevertheless, I shall use ‘the Doctrine of the Trinity’—or just ‘the Doctrine’—to refer to the conjunction of (1) through (7). For my only aim is to defend the Doctrine from the charge that it entails a contradiction. And that charge is inspired by (1) through (7).

The charge is easy to motivate. Taken most straightforwardly and naturally (and given (1)), (2) implies that the Father is a person and the Son is a person and the Father is not identical with the Son. From this we get:

(8) It is false that the Father is identical with the Son.

The most straightforward and natural reading of (5) entails that the Father is God and the Son is God and the Father is identical with the Son. This implies:

(9) The Father is identical with the Son.

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Obviously, (8) and (9) are contradictory. And similar reasoning easily generates contradictory statements about the identity of the Son with the Spirit and of the Spirit with the Father.

I shall defend the Doctrine of the Trinity from the charge that it is contradictory. But before presenting my own arguments, I shall examine two other ways one might try to defend the Doctrine, one involving “relative identity” and the other “social trinitarianism.” My own defense does not require that these familiar defenses fail. But—I shall argue—they do fail. And, in the course of arguing for this, it will become clearer what a successful defense must do.

II

The claim that the Father is the same God as the Son seems to entail that the Father is identical with the Son. This entailment seems to hold because, in general, A’s being the same F as B seems to entail that A is identical with B.

More carefully, this entailment seems to hold for relations like being the same dog as or being the same tree as or being the same human as or being the same God as. But it does not seem to hold for relations like being the same shape as or being the same size as or being the same height as. We are happy to accept, for example, that A is the same height as B while denying that A is identical with B.

Indeed, A’s being the same height as B not only fails to imply that A is identical with B; it also fails to imply that A is a height and that B is a height. A’s being the same dog as B, however, seems to imply not only that A is identical with B but also that A is a
dog and that B is a dog. From now on, when I make a claim about A’s being the same F as B, I shall have in mind only those cases where this entails that A is an F and B is an F. And in those cases, it seems obvious that A’s being the same F as B entails that A is identical with B.¹

At least, it seems obvious to me. Defenders of relative identity, however, deny just this entailment. They typically insist that, for example, A’s being the same tree as B does not imply that A is identical with B. (Paradigmatic relative identity theorists insist on this because, they say, there is no such thing as absolute identity to be entailed; more on this below.) Relative identity is most closely associated with Peter Geach (1972, 238-249 and 1973). But it may not have originated with him. Geach himself claims to find it in Aquinas (Geach, 1961, 118). Moreover, Richard Cartwright reports finding relative identity endorsed by both Anselm and the Eleventh Council of Toledo (Cartwright, 1987, 193).

Whatever its provenance, relative identity promises to free the Doctrine from contradiction. For relative identity tells us that the Father’s being the same God as the Son does not entail that the Father is identical with the Son. If this is right, then obviously the Doctrine does not imply the contradiction noted in the previous section. And of course relative identity offers a way out of similar contradictions regarding the Son’s identity with the Spirit and the Spirit’s with the Father.

¹ I suppose that we could use (for example) ‘being the same dog as’ to express a relation that holds between A and B if and only if A is a dog and B is a dog and A is heavier than B. If we adopted this usage, then of course ‘A is the same dog as B’ would express a proposition entailing that A and B are dogs but not entailing that A is identical with B. (Indeed, since nothing is heavier than itself, it would entail that A is not identical with B.) But, obviously, this has nothing to do with the question of whether A’s being the same dog as B entails that A is identical with B.
This theological benefit notwithstanding, I think we should reject relative identity. To begin to see why, note that John Perry (1970, 185) compares the view that identity is relative to the thesis that being a left-handed brother of does not entail being a brother of. That thesis seems flatly false. But pretend for a moment that it is true. Then, I think, we would have to admit that we have no idea what the relation of being a left-handed brother of is supposed to be. Similarly, pretend for a moment that the thesis of relative identity is true. So let’s pretend, for example, that being the same dog as does not entail being the same as (i.e., being identical with). But then we must admit that we have no idea what the relation of being the same dog as is supposed to be. And it seems that all alleged “relative identity relations” are likewise unintelligible. That is the first objection to relative identity.

Believers in relative identity do not typically think that something special about, say, trees precludes an analysis of being the same tree as in terms of being a tree and being the same as. Rather, they think that all identities—being the same tree as, being the same dog as, being the same electron as, and so on—are relative and so fail to entail being the same as. For they typically deny that there is any such thing as being the same as to be entailed. In other words, and as noted above, they typically deny there is any such thing as absolute (i.e., classical, non-relative, plain old) identity.

Insofar as relative identity implies that there is no absolute identity, then it is false. For surely there is absolute identity. Surely there is something that is identical with itself. This is my second objection to relative identity. Of course, this is no objection to relative identity on its own terms. Geach would not take the rejection of absolute identity to be a reductio of his view; rather, he takes it to be his central insight.
Nevertheless, I think this second objection is decisive. And, at any rate, it is the principal reason I (and I think many others) reject the view that all identity is relative. So I conclude that no defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity is successful if it requires denying that there is something that is identical with itself.

But suppose someone claimed only that identity was *sometimes* relative. So suppose he conceded that there is such a thing as absolute identity and there is something that is identical with itself. But suppose he went on to insist that not every identity implies absolute identity; some identities are relative. Suppose he said, for example, that while *being the same tree as* entails *being the same as*, *being the same God as* does not.

This attenuated version of relative identity is immune to my second objection. And this attenuated version may seem more attractive than full-throttle relative identity, especially if it postulates relative identity only in very unusual cases, cases where absolute identity might seem more trouble than it is worth. For example, one might claim that the logic of absolute identity— which is good enough for everyday purposes— “breaks down at the quantum level” or “breaks down when it comes to the very nature of God.”

Peter van Inwagen presents something like an attenuated version of relative identity in defending the Doctrine of the Trinity. He takes a relative identity reading of the relevant trinitarian claims. But he is careful to add: “...I shall assume neither that classical identity exists nor that it does not exist” (1995, 241). So van Inwagen’s solution, which invokes relative identity, is intended to be consistent with (but not entail) the existence of absolute identity. And so it is meant to be consistent with the claim that,
for example, being the same tree as is analyzed as being a tree and being the same as (i.e., being identical with).

When first motivating the charge of contradiction, I said that, read most naturally and straightforwardly, claim (5)—the Father is the same God as the Son—entails that the Father is identical with the Son. Now those who (like Geach) insist that all identity is relative will disagree. They will object that the most natural and straightforward reading of (5) does not entail the Father’s identity with the Son. For they would say that the relative identity reading of (5) is the most natural and straightforward. After all, they will insist, in every paradigm case of “identity,” we have only one or another kind of relative identity, never absolute identity. And so Geach can, by his own lights, plausibly maintain that his reading of the Doctrine is the default one.

Van Inwagen endorses a relative identity reading of (5). Yet he cannot agree with Geach that that reading of (5) is the most natural and straightforward. For if—like van Inwagen—we do not deny that there is such a thing as absolute identity, we should say that the following is a perfectly intelligible reading of (5): The Father is God and the Son is God and the Father is identical with the Son. And we should surely say that that reading—again, assuming we do not reject absolute identity out of hand—is the most natural and straightforward.

The defender of attenuated relative identity cannot plausibly maintain that her reading is the default one. Rather, she recommends that we take a less-than-most-natural reading. But once we open the door to less-than-most-natural glosses of (1) through (7), there is—absent further argument—no reason to accept the relative identity gloss as opposed to some other.
Now perhaps the defender of attenuated relative identity will reply that no other gloss is as compelling as hers. Fair enough. But in order to make that point, she will have to do more than present her reading of the Doctrine; she’ll have to say something about how it is better than its competitors. And this shows that van Inwagen’s approach faces a hurdle that Geach’s does not. For, as we have seen, Geach can claim that his reading of the Doctrine is the default reading; nothing similar can plausibly be claimed of any of the “glosses,” including the gloss suggested by attenuated relative identity.

As noted above, some object that alleged kind-relative identity relations are unintelligible. But at least Geach can reply that, definitions of those relations aside, we are acquainted with kind-relative identity all the time. With respect to the relativity of identity, Geach would say, being the same God as is just like being the same tree as.

The attenuated relative identity theorist says that identity is relative only with respect to the Trinity—or only in cases far removed from common experience. So she cannot say that being the same God as is anything like being the same tree as. And so being the same God as, besides being undefined, turns out to be unlike paradigm cases of being the same F as, all of which involve absolute identity. In light of this, the objection that relative identity relations are unintelligible is even more compelling when made against attenuated relative identity than when made against Geach’s view.

Geach would say that, because there is no such thing as being the same as, being the same God as does not entail it. This would render the relation of being the same God as mysterious enough. But I think the mystery is increased if there is indeed the relation of being the same as, but being the same God as is allegedly too weak to entail it. After all, given the existence of being the same as, surely there is some relation that entails it.
and being God. If being the same God as is not that relation, then which relation is it? (And what are we supposed to call the relation that entails absolute sameness and otherwise looks for all the world like it is being the same God as?) Again, the charge that relative identity relations are unintelligible gets a leg up if relative identity is attenuated.

Attenuating relative identity exacerbates worries about the intelligibility of the relative identity relations, which worries were serious enough to begin with. This in turn makes it harder for attenuated relative identity to answer adequately the first question asked about it. That question was why—if we are to depart from the most natural and straightforward reading of the Doctrine—should we depart in the relative identity way. For this particular departure, of course, can be no more attractive than it is intelligible.

I say that the attenuated relative identity theorist cannot overcome these challenges. She cannot make the relevant relative identity relations intelligible and so she cannot persuade us that the right reading of the Doctrine invokes them. So I conclude that we should reject her defense of the Doctrine.²

My conclusion is based, in part, on the idea that if attenuated relative identity relations are unintelligible, a defense of the Doctrine in terms of such relations is unacceptable. The final move open to the advocate of this defense is to question that idea. So I close my discussion of attenuated relative identity by considering the following speech:

2 Van Inwagen (1995) meticulously presents the formal properties of some relative identity relations; but I believe this falls short of telling us what those relations are.

Someone might claim that the explicitly stated formal properties are all there is to the relevant relation. That is, someone might claim, for example, that (5) says only that the Father is related to the Son by a relation with the relevant explicitly stated formal properties. But, obviously, she must defend this highly technical gloss on (5), this departure from the most natural and straightforward reading of (5). That is, she must give a reason to believe this is the right way to understand (5).
There is such a thing as absolute identity. So, to avoid contradiction, we must depart from the most natural and straightforward reading of some part of the Doctrine. Let’s depart from the most natural reading of claims invoking “being the same God as.” I depart by saying that such claims assert a relation—call it ‘relation X’—between the divine persons that does not entail absolute identity. I add that, whatever X is, it doesn’t result in a heretical reading of the Doctrine. But that is all I add. Note, specifically, that I don’t purport to make X “intelligible.” Now for some nomenclature: I call X a ‘relative identity relation’ and my view ‘attenuated relative identity’.

The view expressed in this speech is immune to my objections above. But, its “nomenclature” notwithstanding, this speech does not contain an attenuated relative identity defense of the Doctrine. Indeed, it contains no defense of any sort. Instead, it merely expresses confidence that there is some (non-heretical) defense or other. I think this confidence is praiseworthy. Nevertheless, to express such confidence is not the same thing as defending the Doctrine. (That is why someone can, without contradicting himself, say he has no defense of the Doctrine but is confident that some defense or other is out there.) And it is a defense we are after in this paper.

III

Social trinitarianism emphasizes the interpersonal (or social) relationships among the divine persons. Social trinitarianism has many contemporary advocates. Moreover, its advocates credit it with a venerable history, finding its roots in the Cappadocian Fathers, including Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzus (Morris, 1986, 212; Plantinga, 1989, 32; Brown, 1989, 55).

Its recent popularity and rich history notwithstanding, social trinitarianism is sometimes accused of falling into tritheism, one of the two principal heresies regarding
the Trinity. Tritheism, obviously enough, says that there are three Gods. Tritheism does not do justice to claims (5), (6), and (7) of the Doctrine, claims like the Father is the same God as the Son. (The other principal heresy here is modalism, which denies that there really are three distinct divine persons. Modalism does not do justice to claims (2), (3), and (4) of the Doctrine, claims like the Father is not the same person as the Son.) As noted above, I want to defend the Doctrine from the charge that it is contradictory; let me now add that I won’t count as successful any heretical defense.

It is hard to know how to evaluate the charge that social trinitarianism is tritheistic. This is primarily because social trinitarianism itself is hard to define. Sometimes its defenders seem to equate it with the utterly unobjectionable claim that there really are three persons in the Trinity. Thus Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., says:

So the first defense of social trinitarianism against the charge of tritheism is this: to say that Father, Son, and Spirit are the names of distinct persons in a full sense of person scarcely makes one a triteist. (1989, 34)

Or consider this from David Brown:

The most common objection raised against defenders of the social model for the Trinity like myself is that it must inevitably lead to tritheism, given its understanding of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three distinct persons. (1989, 48)

These comments (and others like them; see also Morris, 1986, 212-213) make social trinitarianism sound equivalent to the thesis that the Doctrine of the Trinity is true but modalism is false. There is nothing in this thesis to suggest tritheism, unless one has already cast one’s lot with the heretics by claiming that modalism and tritheism are the only options.

Sometimes, however, social trinitarians do seem triteistic, their protests to the contrary notwithstanding. For example, C. Stephen Layman (1988) argues that because
each divine person is itself a distinct substance, there are three divine substances. And
Thomas Morris at least leans in this direction when he glosses claims about three persons
as claims about three “divine beings” (1986, 217-218). Moreover, Richard Swinburne
claims that “there are three and only three Gods,” saying that this way of putting things
avoids the “traditional terminology” (1988, 234).³

Given the purposes of this paper, it does not matter what exactly social
trinitarianism amounts to or whether that theory—once clearly defined—is tritheistic.
Instead, I want only to explore whether something like social trinitarianism offers an
orthodox defense of the Doctrine against the charge of contradiction. Thus social
trinitarianism is of interest to us only if it (or something like it) can block the charge that
(1) through (7) lead to contradiction.

Let’s start by considering a version of social trinitarianism no one explicitly
endorses. (Discussing this version will set up the main point I want to make about social
trinitarianism as it is actually defended.) So consider absolutely pure social
trinitarianism. It is “pure” because it claims that the unity among the divine persons is
purely social. It claims that harmonious social relationships exhaust that unity. Let’s
assume that perfect love encompasses every such relationship. Thus pure social
trinitarianism asserts that:

(5) The Father is the same God as the Son
means only that the Father and the Son love each other perfectly.

Pure social trinitarianism’s reading of (5) is surely consistent with (2), the claim
that the Father and the Son are not the same person. And since the pure social trinitarian

³ Of course, Swinburne puts his view this way tongue in cheek, not meaning to be explicitly heretical; a
will read (6) and (7) along the same lines as (5), on her reading the Doctrine of the
Trinity is definitely not contradictory.

Pure social trinitarianism renders the Doctrine non-contradictory. Nevertheless, we should reject it. For it is tritheistic. To begin to see why I say this, note that the pure theory implies that A’s being the same God as B is analyzed as A’s being divine, B’s being divine, and A and B’s loving each other perfectly. This understanding of being the same God as implies that two or three or ten humans, when able to love each other perfectly, will be one in the same way that the Father and the Son are one. The relata will of course differ: in the one case it will be humans, in the other divine persons. But the relation—the oneness, the unity—will be the same. Surely, something has gone wrong. Surely, the sense in which the divine persons are one is stronger than the sense in which, once freed from sin and its effects, you and I shall be one.

I believe that each divine person—a divine relatum—loves each of us perfectly. (So the pure theory implies that each of us is thereby “halfway” to being the same God as the Father, the same God as the Son, and the same God as the Spirit!) Given the pure

more recent discussion of the Trinity can be found in Swinburne (1994, 170-191).

4 The only other way to take the pure theory is as identifying the relation of being the same God as with the relation of loving each other perfectly. Thus taken, the pure theory implies that, once conformed to the image of Christ, you will be the same God as I. And I shall be the same God as you. And each of us will be the same God as the Father. This is a reductio.

5 Perhaps some social trinitarians would object. Morris offers the following as partial support of the social theory of the Trinity:

When Jesus...is represented in the gospel of John (17:21) as praying to the Father concerning his disciples and other followers “that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee,” he was surely not asking that there be only a single, solitary Christian. He was asking for unity among numerically distinct individuals, not for numerical identity here, and thus he was implying that he perceived the oneness between himself and the Father not to be that of numerical identity, as that between, say, Cicero and Tully, but rather to be that of some sort of harmonious unity between ontologically distinct individuals. (1986, 209-10).
theory, the only thing keeping us from being one with the Father in just the sense that the Son is one with Him is a failing of love on our part, a failing due to sin. But, again, something has gone wrong. For surely it is false that each of the redeemed in Heaven will enjoy exactly the same unity with the Father as that enjoyed by the Son.

And imagine Apollo, Zeus, and Ares resolving their differences, making amends, mending fences and so finally loving each other perfectly, loving each other just as the Father loves the Son. What you are imagining, I insist, is a species of tritheism. Yet we have the relationship of perfectly loving holding among divine relata. Given the pure theory, each of these divine beings would “be the same God as” each of the others. That is, Apollo would be the same God as Zeus (and so on) in exactly the sense in which the pure theory says that the Father is the same God as the Son (and so on). And I think this shows that the pure theory is tritheistic. (Cf. Leftow, 1999, 232)

As noted above, no actual social trinitarian is pure. For example, Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. thinks that not only love unifies the divine persons, but also (among other things) the impossibility of each person’s existing without the other two (1989, 37). Presumably, there is no limit to the “unifying factors” the social trinitarian can add, just so long as she remains true to her central claims: modalism is false and the divine persons love each other perfectly. Indeed, she can even add that the divine persons are unified by being the same God as. Looked at in this light, it’s hard to see how any orthodox believer could fail to be a sullied social trinitarian.

Social trinitarians need not—must not—defend the pure theory. So they must allow that more than love unites the divine persons. But social trinitarianism as such does not say what this more is. As a result, social trinitarianism is not really a theory
About what (1) through (7) mean. As I noted above, it is hard to say exactly what social trinitarianism is. But I think that the following is in the ballpark and at least makes impure social trinitarianism more than the claim that modalism is false and the divine persons love each other. Social trinitarianism is the view that it is important, for theological and pastoral purposes, to articulate and emphasize the love and other social relationships among the persons of the Trinity. Thus understood, I hope it is clear that whatever its insights, social trinitarianism is not the place to look for a way to block the charge of contradiction.

IV

At one time, a treatment for serious attacks of epilepsy was brain bisection or commisuratomy. (This may seem like a change of subject, but its relevance to the Doctrine will become clear below.) Brain bisection is the severing of the patient’s corpus callosum, a band of nerve fibers through which the brain hemispheres communicate directly with each other. Cutting the corpus callosum limits the spread of a seizure to one half of the brain. Yet it has a side effect, well known and beloved among philosophers of personal identity. After brain bisection, a distinct “sphere of consciousness” seems to be correlated with each brain hemisphere.

Moreover, the evidence indicates that each sphere has its own ways of getting information. Here are some examples. The left half of the patient’s visual field is accessible only to the sphere of consciousness associated with the right hemisphere (and

6 Of course, some particular social trinitarian may have a theory about what (1) through (7) mean. That’s a
vice versa). Similarly, the right-hemisphere-sphere gets tactile input from—and for the most part has motor control over—the left hand (and conversely). And each sphere of consciousness enjoys its very own nostril.

The evidence for these and similar claims is the strange behavior that can be elicited, in experimental situations, from patients who have had the surgery. Here is a representative account:

What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the right hand, can be reported verbally. [Typically, the left hemisphere of the brain controls speech.] What is flashed to the left half field or felt by the left hand cannot be [verbally] reported, though if the word “hat” is flashed on the left, the left hand will retrieve a hat from a group of concealed objects if the person is told to pick out what he has seen. At the same time he will insist verbally that he saw nothing. Or, if two different words are flashed to the two half fields (e.g., “pencil” and “toothbrush”) and the individual is told to retrieve the corresponding object from beneath a screen, with both hands, then the hands will search the collection of objects independently, the right hand picking up the pencil and discarding it while the left hand searches for it, and the left hand similarly rejecting the toothbrush which the right hand lights upon with satisfaction. (Nagel, 1975, 232)

Moreover, “if a split-brain monkey gets hold of a peanut with both hands, the result is sometimes a tug of war” (Nagel, 1975, 231). And a physician told me that, when he extended his hand to a split-brain patient, the patient responded by reaching out to shake with his right hand—and also with his left! (For detailed experimental data, see Gazzaniga, 1970.)

I shall go along with the general consensus that brain bisection results in “two spheres of consciousness.” But I add that brain bisection does not result in two persons. When one person lies down on the table for the surgery, that same person (and she alone)
gets back up. I think this is the right thing to say, in part, because of reflecting on the possibility of a temporarily disabled corpus callosum.

Derek Parfit asks us to suppose that he has:

…been equipped with some device that can block communication between my hemispheres. Since this device is connected to my eyebrows, it is under my control. By raising an eyebrow I can divide my mind. In each half of my divided mind I can then, by lowering an eyebrow, reunite my mind. (1984, 246)

Parfit then imagines availing himself of this device while taking a physics exam. He imagines “dividing his mind” so that he can—in one sphere of consciousness and with one hand—work out one way of solving a problem and—in the other sphere and with the other hand—work out another. He “reunites his mind” ten minutes later.

Suppose this were to happen. Then it seems that Parfit—one person—would acquire a novel psychological ability. But it does not seem that he would acquire a novel way of reproducing; nor does it seem that Parfit would, ten minutes after thus reproducing—and with impunity—annihilate one of his recent offspring (or himself). So I conclude that only one person is involved in the case Parfit imagines. And I think that if there is one person in a case of a temporary division of consciousness, then there is one when the division is more lasting. After all, the number of persons involved should be fixed once the division occurs; whether there is (say) one person right now should not be a matter of what will happen in the future. Thus whether a division will be temporary, or instead be long lasting, is irrelevant to the number of persons resulting when it occurs.

And consider this:

…if the patient is permitted to touch things with both hands and smell them with both nostrils, he arrives at a unified idea of what is going on around him and what he is doing, without revealing any left-right inconsistencies in his behavior or attitudes. It seems strange to suggest that we are not in a position to ascribe all those experiences to the same person, just because of some peculiarities about
how the integration is achieved. The people who know these patients find it natural to relate to them as single individuals. (Nagel, 1975, 238)

(According to Nagel, the “most notable deviation in ordinary behavior was a patient whose left hand appeared to be somewhat hostile to the patient’s wife” (1975, 233).) Brain bisection is not a philosopher’s fantasy. It really occurs. And we really treat those with split brains as a single person. And I think this is the right thing to do.

Anyone who denies that each split-brain patient is a single person must say that those closest to such patients are deeply confused. And I suppose that if there are two persons associated with each split brain, their friends and family (and the law?) should treat them as two persons, radically altering current practice. But I don’t think anyone would seriously recommend changing our practice in this way. I think all will agree that it is false that we should treat each actual split-brain patient as two persons. Yet the claim that two persons result from bisection implies this falsehood. Thus we have a second reason to reject that claim.

Neither of the considerations just noted, however, is the main reason that I say that brain bisection does not multiply persons. The main reason is that—so I say—each of us is a human organism. And I deny that brain bisection results in two human organisms where once there was one. So, I conclude, brain bisection does not result in two of us where once there was one. Instead, brain bisection divides the consciousness of a single human organism; that is, it divides the consciousness of a single person.

The substance dualist could defend a similar argument. Suppose each of us is a simple, immaterial soul. Suppose further, as substance dualists typically do, that each of us (in this life at least) is associated with a particular body and brain. And suppose that bisecting a brain does not produce a new soul. Then brain bisection would not make a
new one of us; it would not produce a new person. Instead, bisecting a brain would split
the consciousness of its associated soul, the one soul that was there all along.\(^7\)

I conclude that brain bisection does not give us two persons where before there
was one. Instead, one person remains, but with two spheres of consciousness. This
conclusion—and my argument for it—is controversial. For I admit that part of my
argument relies on one or another disputed assumption about the nature of human
persons. And I concede that I have gone along, uncritically, with the received view that
brain bisection results in two spheres of consciousness. Thus there are a number of
objections one might raise to my claims above. But I don’t need to respond to these
objections. For, as we shall see below, all that matters for my purposes is that, in making
my controversial claims, I have not contradicted myself.\(^8\)

Perhaps some will charge that what I say above is in some sense contradictory.
Perhaps they will say that I have contradicted some necessary or conceptual truth. Thus
one might claim that it is a matter of necessity—or even analyticity—that one person
cannot have two spheres of consciousness. I reply that this claim itself is controversial.
And so its denial cannot be contradictory in the most straightforward way. It is at least a
live philosophical option that a single human person can have two spheres of
consciousness. After all, it is at least a live philosophical option that a human person is
either an organism or a substantial soul; and, as noted above, if we are organisms or

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\(^7\) The (misguided) claim that a soul “explains the unity of consciousness” is inconsistent with a soul’s
having two spheres of-consciousnesses. But that claim is not an essential part of substance dualism.
Substance dualism itself is consistent with one soul’s having more than one sphere of consciousness.

\(^8\) For the record, I am inclined to deny that, as far as human persons are concerned, there are any objects or
events or whatever that are “spheres of consciousness.” So I would be inclined to object to my description
of split brain cases above, if that description needed to be true in every detail. But—as is further discussed
souls, bisecting a brain would produce a single person with two spheres of consciousness rather than two persons with one sphere each.

Henceforth, when I consider whether something is contradictory, the issue is not whether it merely contradicts a substantive metaphysical thesis. Rather, it is whether it is contradictory in the sense in which the Doctrine of the Trinity is charged with being contradictory. The idea behind that charge, as we saw at the start of this paper, is not merely that the Doctrine contradicts a contentious metaphysical thesis. It is instead (and very roughly) that any clear thinking person can see that the Doctrine leads to a formal contradiction. My reading of split brain cases is not thus contradictory. My reading of these cases is philosophically defensible. My reading is a live philosophical option. And, as we shall see, this is all that my defense of the Doctrine requires of my reading.

V

S’s corpus callosum is severed. S is one person. But she now has two spheres of consciousness, named (for obvious reasons) ‘Lefty’ and ‘Righty’. S decides that she might as well have a little fun with her condition. And so she engages in written correspondence in such a way that if Lefty is involved, Righty is not; and vice versa.

For example, she makes sure that letters sent to her are presented to only one side of her visual field, accessible to only one sphere of consciousness. And she replies to letters read by Lefty with a hand under only Lefty’s control, likewise for letters read by Righty. Moreover, she signs her letters not with her own name, but either as ‘Lefty’ or

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in this section and in §VIII—all that matters is that that description is not contradictory. And it is not contradictory.
‘Righty’, depending of course on the responsible sphere of consciousness. Lefty and Righty take turns on correspondence duty, alternating daily.

You enjoy a lengthy correspondence with S. Because your letter might be received on a day when (for example) Lefty is in charge of correspondence, you can’t assume that anything read by Righty will be available to S as she reads your letter. After all, if S reads the letter “as Lefty,” she won’t read it in the full knowledge of what she previously read “as Righty.” So your letters are to a large extent redundant. Just in case.

In what follows, it is important that, in the story just told, you correspond with S. This is unproblematic. After all, S is a person and persons correspond. Yet it is also important (in what follows) that you correspond—in some sense—with Lefty and with Righty. It is important that, in corresponding with S, you thereby correspond with Lefty or with Righty. And, so I say, this is what happens. After all, it seems clear from the story I have told that Lefty and Righty take turns corresponding.

But someone might object as follows:

In your story Lefty and Righty do not take turns corresponding. Only persons correspond and Lefty and Righty, according to your story, are not persons. And the way S signs her letters—‘Lefty’, ‘Righty’, ‘S’, ‘Willard van Orman Quine’—is irrelevant to who actually wrote them. Let me drive this point home with a story of my own: S* has two eyes, Lefty* and Righty*. Sometimes she tapes Righty* shut, reading and responding to letters making use of only Lefty*; she then signs her letters ‘Lefty*’. I hope you agree that this does not imply that sometimes one corresponds with S’s left eye.

My reply begins by returning to some of the evidence for the claim that brain bisection results in two spheres of consciousness. The patient is told to search for whatever is flashed on the screen. On one side the word ‘pencil’ is flashed, on the other ‘toothbrush’. One of the patient’s hands searches for the pencil but not the toothbrush, the other for the toothbrush but not the pencil.
The natural assumption here—the assumption embodied in the claim that brain bisection results in two spheres of consciousness—is that one sphere of consciousness knows that the word ‘pencil’ was flashed on the screen but not that the word ‘toothbrush’ was; the other sphere knows that the word ‘toothbrush’ was flashed, but not ‘pencil’. The natural interpretation of the experimental data is that each sphere knows something the other doesn’t.

Moreover, the spheres could communicate with each other. If the sphere controlling speech shouted out “I saw the word ‘toothbrush’ on the screen,” then both spheres would know that ‘toothbrush’ was flashed on the screen. Indeed, just as Lefty could communicate with Righty by shouting, so Lefty could communicate with Righty by writing. Lefty could use the right hand to write a letter, a letter which is then projected on the side of the visual field accessible to Righty. And if Lefty can write letters to Righty, she can write them to you.

Nothing remotely like all of this is true of Lefty* and Righty*. It is false that Lefty*, a mere left eye, knows something that Righty* does not. Nor could Lefty* correspond with Righty*. The story of Lefty* and Righty* was intended to support the objection that, in corresponding with S, you do not in any way correspond with Lefty or with Righty. Instead, that story illustrates the failure of that objection. Its failure is illustrated by the fact that the case of Lefty* and Righty* is simply not analogous to the case of Lefty and Righty.

We can reinforce the relevance of the disanalogy by noting that no one defends the claim that an eye is a person. So no one would say that Lefty* and Righty* are persons. And anyone who did would be beyond the philosophical pale. But some insist
that spheres of consciousness are persons. (We shall see later that some social trinitarians seem to say this.) So some will insist that Lefty and Righty are persons. For reasons noted in Section IV, I disagree with them. But their view is not crazy. They are not beyond the pale. Unlike eyes, spheres of consciousness are at least somewhat person-like.

They are “person-like.” For, as noted above, there seems to be some sense in which spheres of consciousness, again unlike eyes, know things and can correspond. Indeed, let’s add that S’s corresponding is somehow analyzed in terms of Lefty’s corresponding or Righty’s corresponding. (Or perhaps vice versa.) This analysis is most plausible—and most clearly non-circular—if the sense in which S corresponds is a different sense from the sense in which Lefty or Righty corresponds. So let’s add that. Let’s add that although there is a sense in which S corresponds and a sense in which Lefty corresponds, there is no univocal sense of ‘correspond’ in which both S and Lefty correspond.9 We can also add that Lefty’s and Righty’s failing to correspond—or to know or to think or to love or to hope or to believe—in the sense in which S does partly explains why Lefty and Righty fail to be persons.

Recall your lengthy correspondence. The letters from S pile up on your desk. A colleague leafs through them and asks: “Who has been writing to you?” You say: “S; remember her?” He says: “Sure. But”—glancing at the signatures on the letters—“who is Lefty? Who is Righty?” You think to yourself that letters from Lefty just are letters from S, likewise letters from Righty. You think that to write to S is nothing other than to

9 Compare: The baseball causes the window to shatter and the baseball’s striking the window causes the window to shatter. Both the baseball and the striking really do cause this, but in different senses of ‘cause’.
write to Lefty or to write to Righty. You think that to hear from S just would be to hear from Lefty or to hear from Righty. And so you say: “Lefty is S. Righty is S. They are both our friend S.” To clarify that there is just one person (i.e., S) authoring the letters, you add the following:

(A) Lefty is the same person as Righty.

Read in the most natural and straightforward way, (A) is false. For thus read, (A) implies that Lefty is a person and Righty is a person and Lefty is identical with Righty. Yet neither Lefty nor Righty is a person; each is, instead, a sphere of consciousness; nor is Lefty identical with Righty. Nevertheless, (A) seems like an appropriate thing to say. You may not have told your colleague the whole story; but you haven’t been obscurantist, either. (A) is a pretty good first stab at the situation.

You aren’t sure exactly how to go beyond the first stab. For you aren’t quite sure what more to say about Lefty and Righty. It might help if they were physical objects, like brain hemispheres. But you know that can’t be right. For (we now add to our story) substance dualism is true. So rather than physical objects like brains or brain hemispheres, it is immaterial objects—souls—that have mental properties. You know all this. So you know that each “sphere of consciousness” is not “had” by a brain hemisphere, but by S’s soul (i.e., by S herself). So you can safely rule out the possibility that Lefty and Righty are themselves brain hemispheres. You can likewise rule out the possibility that Lefty and Righty are proper parts of S. For S has no proper parts at all.

S is a soul. So she has physical properties only (at best) in an extended and relational sense. For example, the claim that she is over five feet tall is (at best) a

And perhaps the baseball’s “object-causing” an effect is analyzed as the ball’s being the constituent object of an event that “event-causes” that effect.
shorthand way of saying that she is appropriately related to a body that is over five feet
tall. But not all of S’s properties are thus extrinsic; not all of her properties are relations
to her body. Her mental properties are intrinsic.

Because S’s mental properties are intrinsic, it is possible for S to have her mental properties without standing in relations to contingent things outside of herself, to things like her body. This is not to deny that S’s intrinsic mental properties are typically related in important ways to her body. For example, stimulate her body in the right way, and S’s soul will feel pain. Sever the corpus callosum in her body’s brain, and S’s consciousness will be divided. But any relation here is presumably causal and so contingent. So if S is a soul, it is possible for her to feel pain even if disembodied. And if S is a soul, her consciousness could be divided even if no split brain belongs to her.

VI

Let’s alter the story a bit. S has not undergone brain bisection. Indeed, S could not undergo brain bisection. No brain belongs to her. For, we are now imagining, S is a disembodied soul who has never had a body or a brain. Nevertheless, S has a divided consciousness of the sort typically induced by brain bisection. And S is somehow able to communicate with the embodied. She can somehow control a pen so as to write letters. And she can somehow read letters written to her.

You didn’t know anything about S until you saw her ad in the personals. You like what the ad says (no picture, though), so you begin to correspond. Or at least you try to. You are frustrated to find that your letters are sometimes answered by Lefty and
sometimes by Righty but—so it seems to you—never by S. (Lefty and Righty presume to speak for S—indeed, they write as if they were S—so you assume that they are secretaries, acting under S’s direction.)

You are annoyed by the—so it seems to you—impersonal nature of this arrangement. And, to make matters worse, apparently Lefty and Righty don’t communicate with each other or with S very well. For example, you tell S in one letter that you like long walks on the beach and fruity rum drinks. But, in a letter S writes (by way of Lefty) several weeks later, she asks if you are a teetotaler. You begin to wonder whether your letters are reaching S at all.

You write several times demanding to correspond with S directly, not via Lefty or Righty. But S (in a letter from Lefty and also in a letter from Righty) replies that you demand the incoherent. Your demand, she says, presupposes that Lefty and Righty are intermediaries between you and her, intermediaries that can somehow be circumvented. But that presupposition, she continues, is all wrong. Rather, to write to Lefty or to write to Righty just is to write to her. To correspond with her is nothing other than to correspond with Lefty or with Righty. S tells you that your asking to correspond with her but with neither Lefty nor Righty is like her asking to correspond with you but not with your mind.

S realizes that these claims will seem odd to you. So she tries to cast light on them by explaining her somewhat peculiar nature. She says things like: “I am one immaterial person but two spheres of consciousness.” She is careful to insist that she is not two immaterial persons. And she emphasizes that Lefty and Righty are not merely roles she occupies.
Now reconsider the following:

(A) Lefty is the same person as Righty.

Taken most naturally and straightforwardly, (A) is false; for thus taken it entails that Lefty is a person, Righty is a person, and Lefty is identical with Righty. But, in light of the story I have just told, I think there is a fairly natural reading of (A) that comes out true.

Above I tried to motivate the way in which (A) seems true. But let me say more. Note that if you want a relationship with S, you have a relationship with Lefty or Righty. To interact with Lefty or Righty is to interact with S. And for S to love you just is for Lefty to love you or for Righty to love you. Likewise for S’s hating you or talking to you or issuing a command to you or… For the purposes of friendship and interaction—indeed, for all practical purposes—Lefty is the same person (that is, S) as Righty.

Moreover, when (for example) S issues a command and Righty issues that command, the command is not issued twice over. For S’s commanding does not duplicate Righty’s commanding. Rather, S’s acting in any way at all is somehow analyzed as either Righty’s acting or Lefty’s acting. (Or perhaps it goes the other way, and Righty and Lefty’s acting are analyzed in terms of S’s acting.) Thus Lefty’s acting is the same person’s acting—S’s acting—as is Righty’s acting. Lefty is the same actor—that is, S—as Righty. (That is, Lefty is the same actor as Righty in the sense of ‘actor’ in which we have one actor: S. In another sense of ‘actor’, we have two: Lefty and Righty. But in no univocal sense of ‘actor’ do we have three.)

Similarly, for S to believe a proposition (for example, the proposition that the word ‘toothbrush’ is flashed on the screen) just is for Righty to believe that proposition or
for Lefty to believe it. Righty’s believing something is the same person’s believing it—
S’s believing it—as is Lefty’s believing something. Righty is the same believer—when
by ‘believer’ we mean person who believes—as is Lefty.

S’s believing something just is Righty’s believing it or Lefty’s believing it. But
there is no contradiction if Righty believes that the word ‘toothbrush’ is flashed on the
screen but Lefty does not. For this does not imply both that S believes this and also that
it is false that S believes this. Rather, it implies that S believes in one way that the word
‘toothbrush’ is on the screen and fails to believe this in some other way.

Not only is it possible for S to believe one thing by way of Righty but not by way
of Lefty, sometimes this is how it should be. If ‘toothbrush’ is only in the left half of her
visual field, S should believe by way of Righty that ‘toothbrush’ is on the screen; but S
would be unjustified in believing this by way of Lefty’s believing it. More interestingly,
there may be some things that S would be unjustified in believing by way of Lefty’s
believing it no matter what. These might include claims like “this sphere of
consciousness controls my left hand” or “this sphere of consciousness is Righty.”

Indeed, we can even suppose some ambiguity in the word ‘I’ so that on one
reading it refers to the relevant person, on another to the relevant sphere of
consciousness. Then S might truly and justifiably believe, by way of Righty, “I am
Righty”; but it would always be amiss for S to believe this by way of Lefty’s believing it.
Similar comments apply, of course, to the ways S can justifiably believe “I am Lefty” and
“this sphere controls my right hand.” And given this ambiguity of ‘I’, we can see why S
would find herself saying things like “I am exactly one person but I am a first sphere of
consciousness and I am also a second sphere of consciousness.”
Above I noted that there is a sense in which Lefty is the same believer as Righty; and I also noted that there is a sense in which Lefty is the same actor as Righty. For reasons like these, I conclude that (A)—Lefty is the same person as Righty—is an appropriate and fairly direct way to express a truth. Indeed, I don’t know of any better way to express that truth. We can get at it by multiplying examples like those above. Yet all those examples seem to support or indicate or gesture at a peculiar relationship between Lefty and Righty, a relationship that I can’t better express than by saying that they are, in some very important sense, the same person.

Given the story I have told, the following is true taken straightforwardly and naturally. Lefty and Righty are both spheres of consciousness and:

(B) Lefty is not the same sphere of consciousness as Righty.

In light of the above, I say that our story about disembodied S shows that (A) and (B) are non-contradictory when appropriately understood. Moreover, I say, (A) and (B) are not obscurantist or misleading. They do as good a job as any pair of claims could at getting at what is going on in the story. And if all that is right, then I suggest we should—because of the obvious analogies—say something similar about the following two claims. I say we should conclude that the following need be neither contradictory nor obscurantist and misleading:

(5) The Father is the same God as the Son.

(2) The Father is not the same person as the Son.

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10 Some might object that there is a contradiction in my story’s claim that disembodied S corresponds with embodied humans. In reply, if it is contradictory for a non-physical thing to interact in these ways with the physical world, then theism itself—with its creator God—is itself contradictory. But theism is not contradictory. And if it were, there would be no point to defending the trinitarian species of theism.
Indeed, I think the analogy between the story of S and the Doctrine of the Trinity is even stronger than (A) and (B) and (5) and (2) suggest. To begin to see why I say this, note that orthodoxy requires us to say that the three divine persons are not three substances. What, then, are they? In presenting his social theory of the Trinity, Plantinga says:

[A social theory of the Trinity] must have Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and action. Since each of these capacities requires consciousness, it follows that, on this sort of theory, Father, Son, and Spirit would be viewed as distinct centers of consciousness or, in short, as persons in some full sense of that term. (1989, 22; emphasis in original)

Similarly, Morris, another social trinitarian, often uses ‘centers of consciousness’ as a synonym for ‘persons’ (1986, 210-218).

The social trinitarian cannot accuse us of modalism if we defend the claim that there are three divine persons in what she takes to be the relevant sense of ‘person’. And so even modalism’s most emphatic opponents should have no objection to our glossing (2) as:

(2*) The Father is not the same center of consciousness as the Son.

Of course, something similar can be said about Lefty and Righty. So let’s say it:

(B*) Lefty is not the same center of consciousness as Righty.

One might worry that the persons of the Trinity cannot be separate centers of consciousness in the way that Lefty and Righty are. For, so the worry goes, Lefty’s knowing something unknown to Righty—such as that the word ‘toothbrush’ is flashed on the screen—is crucial to their being two centers rather than one. And even if Lefty and Righty just happen to know all the same things, there could be a difference in knowledge between them. But not so for the persons of the Trinity, who are all omniscient.
Furthermore, even if Lefty and Righty willed the same things, there could be a difference in volition between them. But, again, not so for the divine persons, who essentially will the same things. Thus, one might charge, the divine persons cannot be different centers of consciousness in the way in which Lefty and Righty are.

This objection presupposes that what makes Lefty a different center of consciousness from Righty is that they possibly differ with respect to some mental attribute such as knowledge or will. But I think this gets it backwards. I say that mental differences between Lefty and Righty are possible only if it is already the case that Lefty and Righty are two centers. (If they were one and the same center, such differences would be impossible.) So I say that a difference (or possible difference) in mental attributes is not what makes centers of consciousness distinct. Thus a lack of mental difference among the members of the Trinity would not preclude their being distinct centers of consciousness.

Besides, there almost surely are mental differences among the divine persons. Presumably, one of them has the belief “I am the Father” and the others do not; one of them believes “I proceed from the Father through the Son” but not the others; and so on. Moreover—and more speculatively—perhaps they differ in how things seem to them (that is, in terms of their subjective phenomenological experience) or in what they consciously entertain. And so even if a difference (or possible difference) in mental attributes were required for centers of consciousness to be distinct, this would be no threat to the analogy suggested by (2*) and (B*).

The analogy doesn’t end with (2*) and (B*). As already noted, the three divine persons are not three divine substances. There is only one such substance, God. And the
claim that each divine person is God is standardly taken to be equivalent to the claim that each is this one divine substance. With this in mind, we can endorse:

\[(5^*)\] The Father is the same substance as the Son.

The divine persons are not substances. But S is. Being a soul, she is an immaterial substance. Thus—in the same sense in which we endorsed (A) above—we can add:

\[(A^*)\] Lefty is the same substance as Righty.

It should be obvious that there is a striking analogy between \((A^*)\) and \((B^*)\) and \((5^*)\) and \((2^*)\). And note that the story of S and Lefty and Righty contains no analogue of modalism or tritheism; that is, that story does justice to the diversity of Lefty and Righty and to the unity of S. Moreover, \((A^*)\) and \((B^*)\), as I have explained them, are not contradictory. So I conclude that—even if we insist on orthodoxy—we are not compelled to think that \((5^*)\) and \((2^*)\) are contradictory; likewise for the Doctrine as a whole.

VII

Someone might object that I don’t really endorse \((A^*)\), since I reject its most natural and straightforward reading, since I deny the claim that Lefty is a substance and Righty is a substance and Lefty is identical with Righty. And so, someone might suspect, since I take \((5^*)\) to be analogous to \((A^*)\), I don’t really endorse \((5^*)\) either.

In reply, return to the point that opened this paper. If each of the Doctrine’s claims is read in the most straightforward and natural way possible, the Doctrine is
contradictory. So, assuming that the Doctrine is non-contradictory, at least some of its claims should not be read in the most straightforward and natural way possible. Nevertheless, to borrow language used earlier, a defense of the Doctrine must “do justice” to all its claims, even the ones that are not read in the most straightforward way possible.

Like the pure social trinitarian, I reject the most natural and straightforward reading of the claim that the Father is the same substance as the Son. For that reading entails that the Father is a substance, the Son is a substance, and the Father is identical with the Son. But I think that, unlike the pure social trinitarian, I “do justice” to that claim. After all, I have argued, my story “does justice” to the claim that Lefty is the same substance as Righty (although of course I reject that claim’s most natural and straightforward reading). And I say that the Father’s being the same substance as the Son is analogous to Lefty’s being the same substance as Righty.

To get a better sense of the analogy here, consider that corresponding with Lefty is corresponding with the same substance as is corresponding with Righty. Similarly, praying to the Son is praying to the same substance as is praying to the Father. Also, Lefty’s commanding is the same substance’s commanding as is Righty’s commanding. Similarly, the Son’s commanding is the same substance’s commanding as is the Father’s commanding. And so on.

It should be clear that my treatment of (5) and (5*) is not that of the pure social trinitarian. But some might worry that it falls into relative identity. After all, so this worry goes, I read ‘is the same God as’ and ‘is the same divine substance as’ in such a way that each fails to imply absolute identity. And merely adding—as I most certainly
do add—that there is such a thing as absolute identity is not enough to fend off this worry. For this addition leaves open the possibility that my view is a species of attenuated relative identity.

My first reply is that endorsing “the Father is the same God as the Son” while denying that the Father is identical with the Son does not automatically make one a relative identity theorist. If it did, pure social trinitarianism—and probably any way of rendering the doctrine non-contradictory—would count as a version of relative identity.

My second reply is to highlight one of the more important ways my view differs from every version of relative identity. The relative identity theorist says that the Father’s “being the same substance as” the Son does not entail their absolute identity but does entail that each is a divine substance. I agree that the Father’s “being the same substance as” the Son does not entail their identity. But, unlike the relative identity theorist, I say this fails to entail that each is—in the most straightforward sense—a divine substance.

To clarify this feature of my view, return to Lefty and Righty. While I affirm a properly interpreted (A*)—Lefty is the same substance as Righty—I deny that Lefty is a substance in the most straightforward sense. Note, however, that in just the same sense that Lefty “is the same substance as” Righty, so Lefty “is the substance S” and thus “is a substance.” Understood in a certain way, then, Lefty is a substance. Nevertheless, Lefty is not a substance in the straightforward way that S is. Rather, Lefty is a substance only in virtue of her peculiar relationship to S.

Lefty is a substance in a less-than-straightforward sense. Likewise, I’d say that each divine person is a substance in a less-than-most-straightforward sense. The Father is
a substance; the Son is a substance; the Spirit is a substance; and yet—speaking most straightforwardly—there are not three divine substances but one. For each is a substance in virtue of being the same substance as each of the others. Similarly, the Father is God; the Son is God; the Spirit is God; and yet there are not three Gods but one God.

Recall again the story of your correspondence with Lefty and Righty and S. Obviously, it would be a mistake to say that you correspond with three persons. It would be a mistake even to say that you correspond with three things. For, to return to a theme developed earlier, S and the two spheres of consciousness do not correspond in the same sense. S’s corresponding in one sense is somehow analyzed in terms of—or is itself part of the analysis of—Righty’s corresponding or Lefty’s corresponding in another sense. So in one sense of ‘correspond’, you correspond with one thing: S. In another sense of ‘correspond’, you correspond with two things: Lefty and Righty. But in no single sense of ‘correspond’ do you correspond with Lefty, Righty, and S.

With all this in mind, consider the objection that the believer in the Trinity worships four things, believes that there are four things that are omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good: Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and God. I suppose the pure social trinitarian can block this objection right away, insisting that there are exactly three such things, end of story. And the relative identity theorist might insist that this objection presupposes something unacceptable about not being the same thing as, a relation suspiciously like not being absolutely identical with. But I think the analogy between (A*) and (B*) and (5*) and (2*) suggests a reply that is better than the two just mentioned, a reply that in turn casts light on the depth of the analogy itself.
The analogy suggests that in one sense of, for example, ‘is perfectly good’, there are three such things (the divine persons), and in another sense there is one (God). But—just as there is no single sense of ‘correspond’ in which Lefty, Righty, and S all correspond—there is no single sense of ‘is perfectly good’ in which the Father, the Son, the Spirit, and God are all perfectly good. (Presumably, the persons’ being perfectly good in one sense is somehow analyzed in terms of God’s being perfectly good in another sense, or vice versa.) More generally, we could say that, taken one way, there are three things worthy of worship, taken another just one; but in no univocal sense of ‘worthy of worship’ are there four such things. Thus the analogy developed in this paper not only defends the Doctrine from the charge of contradiction, but also suggests a reply to the objection that trinitarians worship four things.

VIII

The story of disembodied S includes something controversial about the nature of human beings. Perhaps the claim that human persons are immaterial souls is false. (I think it is.) And perhaps if it is false, it is necessarily false. And so perhaps the story I told is impossible. And so—one might object—nothing I have said suggests that the Doctrine of the Trinity is possibly true.

If a triune God exists, then this is (presumably) a matter of necessity. And so to show that (1) through (7) are possibly true would be tantamount to showing that they are in fact true. Yet surely we do not need to show that the Doctrine is true to defend it from the charge that it is contradictory. And so surely we do not need to show that the
Doctrine is possibly true to defend it from that charge. So although I have not shown that the Doctrine is possibly true, I do think the analogy defended above shows that we are not forced to conclude that the Doctrine is contradictory. As I put a similar point earlier in the paper, the Doctrine of the Trinity is at least a live philosophical option.

I claim only that (A) and (B) and (A*) and (B*) are appropriately analogous to the Doctrine of the Trinity. I do not claim to have presented a theory of the Trinity. I have not defended a gloss or account or analysis of ‘being the same God as’ as it is used in formulating the Doctrine. I do not claim that each divine person is a center of consciousness exactly like Lefty and Righty and that God is an immaterial substance akin to S’s soul.

One reason that I don’t claim this is that, even if there were human souls, God and souls would not be kindmates. Of course, God and souls would be alike in being immaterial. But this alone does not make them members of the same kind, lest that kind include, for example, abstract objects as well. And the other obvious way in which God is like a human soul—having mental properties—does not suggest a theory of the nature of God, lest it suggest that all beings with mentality (humans, God, angels, demons, dolphins, dogs) have the same nature.

Similarly, I do not think that reflections on Lefty and Righty yield an analysis of what it is to be a divine person. One reason is that, beyond the sorts of things already said in this paper, I don’t know what a center of consciousness is. And I certainly do not purport to have an informative account of being a center of consciousness that applies univocally to Lefty and to the Father.
Nor do I claim to have an account of being a person that applies univocally to S and to the Father. Indeed, I think it is an open question whether there is any such account. And because it is a difficult question with a long history (e.g., Boethius explicitly addresses it in Contra Eutychon, III), I don’t want anything I say here to turn on how that question is answered.

And nothing I say does turn on how it is answered. It should be clear, for example, that nothing I say here requires that S and the Father are persons in exactly the same sense of ‘person’. Moreover, nothing I say requires that S and the Father are not persons in just the same sense of ‘person’. My argument does require that I can tell a non-contradictory story according to which S is a person and also a substantial human soul. But that does not so much as suggest that ‘person’ means substantial human soul. (If it meant that, the Father would not be a person.) Nor does it suggest any other reason to deny that ‘person’ applies to the Father in just the same sense that it applies to S.

My argument requires that Lefty and Righty are not persons. So I must insist that ‘person’ does not mean a center of consciousness in just the way Lefty is a center of consciousness. (If it meant that, Lefty would be a person.) But this does not entail that the Father is not a person, since the Father is not like Lefty in every way. Again, as far as this paper goes, it is an open question whether ‘person’ is predicated univocally of S (and of you and me) and of the Father.

My defense of the Doctrine leaves us wondering what it is to be a person. And we are left wondering what it is to be a center of consciousness. And we are left wondering whether we are persons in exactly the sense that the Father is a person.
Moreover, we are left wondering how deep the analogy between Lefty—who is “person-like”—and the Father—who is a person—goes.

There is no clear answer to any of these questions. At least, my defense contains no clear answers. Moreover, there are no answers from the logic of identity or the law of non-contradiction or merely knowing how to count. And so believers in the Trinity can happily admit not knowing how to answer these questions. Happier still, we can do so without feigning ignorance about one, three, or identity.

I claim that I have defended the Doctrine from the charge of contradiction. But I also deny having a theory of the nature of the Trinity. Someone might object that I can’t make my defense without such a theory. For, so this objection goes, unless we know exactly how to interpret (1) through (7), we have no right to say that (1) through (7) are non-contradictory. And unless we can rightfully say that, we have no defense against the charge that the Doctrine is contradictory.

I concede that I have not proven that the Doctrine, rightly interpreted, is not contradictory. But such a proof is not the only way to defend the Doctrine from the charge of contradiction. One could, instead, argue that there is no compelling reason to believe the Doctrine is contradictory. It is this sort of defense I have presented.

Let’s return to my defense one last time. So suppose the story I told about disembodied S is true. Even in such a (comparatively) mundane case, mysteries persist. We don’t know the nature of S’s soul, other than its being non-physical and mental. (So we do not know what makes S a different kind of thing from angels and demons and God.) Nor do we know what exactly spheres of consciousness are.
Suppose, again, that the story about disembodied S is true. But suppose further that we (like the Church Fathers) are unfamiliar with brain bisection and its odd effects. Suppose moreover that the ideas of a soul (much less a disembodied one) and of a sphere of consciousness have never occurred to us. And finally suppose that S decides to reveal her nature to us so as to help us interact with her rather than to teach us metaphysics.

Then (A) and (B) and (A*) and (B*) would get at something non-contradictory in about as clear and direct a way as we could hope for. Then (A) and (B) and (A*) and (B*) would be in equal measure appropriate and puzzling and—when rightly interpreted—non-contradictory.

And so, I say, it goes for claims (1) through (7). A full-blown theory of the metaphysics of the Trinity would tell us what the divine substance is and what the divine persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—are. I don’t have that. But I do think we have seen enough to conclude that (1) through (7) could be wholly appropriate and puzzling and—when rightly interpreted—non-contradictory. And so we are not forced to conclude that they are in fact contradictory. The charge of contradiction fails to stick.

References


Leftow, Brian (1999) “Anti Social Trinitarianism” in Davis, Kendall, and O’Collins.


