Illumining the Dark Side of the Ivory Tower: A Policy Analysis of the Campus Accountability and Safety Act

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INTRODUCTION

College campuses have long been seen as a safe haven. In reality, universities have suffered from a history of violence that administrators and policymakers long ignored. One of the most pressing campus crime issues today is the rampant nature of sexual violence within higher education institutions, demonstrated by a recent White House report that discovered one in five college women are sexually victimized while in college (“The White House”, 2014). Despite legislative efforts to comprehensively address this issue, these high rates of collegiate sexual assault rates have remained steady (Koss, Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987; Fisher, Cullen, & Turner, 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2006; “The White House”, 2014). Legislation introduced in the 113th Congress, known as the Campus Accountability and Safety Act (CASA), seeks to address this issue by increasing the transparency of college sexual assault statistics and incentivizing schools to work to make their campuses safer for the student body.

This study analyzes CASA, its likelihood of passage, its potential implementation challenges, and its ability to meet its stated goals. This is accomplished by first observing the history of campus crime and its ascension into the realm of public concern and policy responses. After observing prior legislative responses to campus crime, the provisions of CASA are analyzed using Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams
model. The potential implementation of CASA is also addressed, as well as its ability to reduce sexual violence according to Cohen and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activities Theory. The study concludes with recommendations for future policies that could successfully survive Congressional scrutiny and reduce sexual victimization on college campuses, while giving a glimpse into the future of the campus sexual violence policy arena.

BACKGROUND

Campus violence dates back centuries, with the “culture of deviance” becoming a trademark of college campuses in the late 17th century (Sloan & Fisher, 2010). The 1960s brought the first major policy changes in this realm, as state governors built “get tough” campaigns directed at college administrators. This was largely a result of the unrest of the 1960s that brought mass takeovers of buildings, Vietnam War protests, a deadly clash with the National Guard at Kent State University, and new sexual moralities to college campuses. During this time, most administrators remained largely complacent and failed to address the safety concerns of their respective institutions. As accounts of college women being sexually exploited became more prevalent, reports began to describe college campuses as having a “rape culture.” Media then began to latch on to this dark side of the ivory tower (Sloan & Fisher, 2010).

Four advocacy groups capitalized on and helped publicize the growing unrest on college campuses. They each claimed ownership of an issue and pushed policymakers to address this newly crystallized social problem. The first group was Security on Campus, Inc. (SOC), a nonprofit founded by the parents of Jeanne Clery, a Lehigh University student who was sexually assaulted and murdered in her campus dorm in 1986.
This dorm was crime ridden; yet, administrators failed to notify students of these issues. SOC pushed for legislative action to improve campus security and transparency in college crime statistics (Keels, 2004).

Campus crime victims and their families also latched onto the issue of lax security and lack of transparency. This group was unique in that they used the courts as their avenue for change. Court decisions began to shift in the late 1980s, as the judiciary held higher education institutions liable for on-campus victimization. Campus feminists, the third group, identified sexual victimization of college students as a major issue. They highlighted collegiate sexual victimization statistics and helped reshape cultural views to recognize date and acquaintance rape as “real rape.” The fourth group was public health researchers, who were concerned with what they perceived as rampant binge drinking on college campuses and the negative externalities it subsequently produced. These researchers, either affiliated with prestigious universities or funded by federal agencies, conceptualized binge drinking and gathered national data to support their claims of its rampant nature and many negative effects (Sloan & Fisher, 2010).

While these groups focused on separate issues, their collective legacy is the recasting of campus crime from a university problem to a societal problem. With media assistance, they effectively spread their message about the heinous events occurring on campuses and vilified administrators. State and federal legislation, court rulings, and mandates from executive agencies addressed each group’s claims. This action compelled administrators to respond with institutional level policies to comply with these new mandates (Sloan & Fisher, 2010).
SPECIFIC POLICY RESPONSES

Congress passed the *Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act of 1990*, later renamed the *Clery Act*, largely in response to SOC’s advocacy efforts. The Act requires higher education institutions to distribute an annual security report detailing their campus security policies and annual crime statistics. The Department of Education (ED) monitors compliance with the *Clery Act*, and violators are liable to lose federal funding (Carter & Bath, 2007).

In 1992, Congress passed the *Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights*, requiring that universities give sexual assault victims and the accused basic rights in regards to their campus disciplinary hearings. Universities must also give survivors the ability to notify law enforcement and help them alter their living situation (Carter & Bath, 2007). Campus feminists pushed hard for this legislation, as they saw female sexual assault victims being “revictimized” by administrators who mishandled investigations (Sloan & Fisher, 2010).

In 2008, Congress passed the *Higher Education Opportunity Act*, which added emergency response and notification provisions to the *Clery Act*, expanded campus police authority, increased hate crimes to be reported under the *Clery Act*, and assisted whistleblowers (“Clery Center”). Parts of this Act were a reaction to the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre (Fallahi, Lesik, & Gold, 2009). In 2013, Congress passed the *Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act* (Campus SaVE), which amended the *Clery Act* to give sexual and/or dating violence victims additional rights and mandated institutional policies to prevent these crimes (“Clery Center”).
State legislatures began passing laws in the late 1980s that closely resembled the Clery Act (“Policy Accomplishments”). Some state legislatures currently argue that they are better suited to legislate in this area since they work frequently with their states’ colleges and thus may be in a better position to tailor the legislation to fit their institutions (Weiser, 2001).

While these policy responses each addressed safety concerns, there are still many campus sexual assault issues that demand attention. These issues include, but are not limited to, the inadequacy of official college sexual assault statistics, the low number of victims that report to college or law enforcement officials, providing services necessary for victims to recover from the incident, and the low number of offenders that are charged or disciplined. CASA seeks to address these issues and improve upon the foundation built by previous legislation.

THE CAMPUSS ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAFETY ACT

The bipartisan Campus Accountability and Safety Act (CASA) has five main provisions: (1) Universities would be required to designate confidential advisors whom sexual assault survivors can consult for information about support services and accommodations; (2) Training for individuals involved in investigations, disciplinary proceedings, and support in sexual assault cases would be mandated; (3) An annual survey would be created, with results published online, that collects data on each universities’ rate of sexual violence, and the ED would publish a list of schools investigated regarding Title IX violations; (4) Campus disciplinary proceedings would be centralized to prevent subgroups, such as an athletic department, from handling sexual violence cases involving their members; and (5) Financial penalties would
be established to punish noncompliance ("Campus Accountability and Safety Act"; McCaskill, 2014).

ANALYSIS OF CASA USING KINGDON’S MODEL

In assessing the policy forces behind CASA, and its ability to make its way through Congress, John Kingdon’s multiple streams model frames the analysis. Kingdon (1985) writes that three separate streams, the problem, policy, and politics streams, must come together in order to give a policy an increased chance for success. In constructing the problem stream, Kingdon (1985) assessed how government officials fix their attention on one problem rather than another. Mechanisms such as indicators, focusing events, and feedback help bring problems to the attention of government officials. Within the policy stream, a solution to the problem needs to be available after a selection process that begins with a large number of policy initiatives and is narrowed to a short list under serious consideration. Within the political stream, policymakers are motivated and have the opportunity to turn the solution into policy. An open window can then allow for the convergence of these three streams (Kingdon, 1984).

Within the problem stream, indicators and feedback have helped prioritize sexual violence on college campuses as a problem. In regards to indicators, a major goal of CASA is to increase the transparency of campus sexual assault statistics. Since approximately only 11 percent of college women that are raped actually report it to the police (Kilpatrick, et al., 2007), victimization and self-report surveys provide the best avenue for gauging the rates of these incidents. Early versions of these studies indicated that one in four college women had been a victim of rape or attempted rape during college (Sloan and Fisher, 2010), and subsequent studies largely replicated this high rate (Koss, Gidyzc, & Wisniewki, 1987; Fisher,
Cullen, & Turner, 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2006). Recently, a White House-commissioned study found that one in five women are sexually assaulted while in college (“The White House”, 2014). Yet, less than ten percent of reported cases result in criminal charges (Alderden & Ullman, 2012).

In regards to feedback, information indicates that current campus safety legislation is failing to meet its intended goals. This feedback is best encapsulated by the apparent failures of the Clery Act. Kerr (2001) and Cohen (2005) found that a majority of institutions observed did not comply with the Clery Act. Janosik and Gehring (2003) found a majority of students are unaware of the Clery Act and annual crime statistics. Sloan, Fisher, and Cullen (1997) concluded that the Act might foster underreporting because it relies on official reports, while many crimes go unreported. Because the Clery Act and CASA are similar, this unsatisfying feedback negatively affects the latter and consequently brings into question its ability to meet its intended goals. Both acts seek to reduce campus crime through increased transparency in campus crime data and by ensuring that the ED monitors compliance (Carter & Bath, 2007; Bahr, 2014).

Within the problem stream, focusing events can play a major role. In terms of college sexual assaults, there is potential for one of the many horrid reports of sexual assault incidents to reach the level of a focusing event. The recent story in Rolling Stone Magazine by Sabrina Erdely (2014), titled A Rape on Campus: A Brutal Assault and Struggle for Justice at UVA, detailing an alleged campus gang rape had the potential of becoming a focusing event, as it received a wealth of national attention. Later details that questioned the validity of the story severely damaged this potential and eventually caused Rolling Stone Magazine to issue an apology (Calamur, 2014). These discrepancies in details largely inhibited, if not completely
derailed, this story’s ability to become a focusing event, and could further hinder future victim accounts from garnering large-scale attention and rising to a level that demands policy attention. Future or past campus rape survivors may now be hesitant to report their victimization after seeing the ramifications that have arisen from the Rolling Stone article. This story’s failures may also make the public skeptical of future victim accounts. In either case, campus rape incidents remain in the dark and cannot become a focusing event. If passed, CASA has the ability to bring these incidents out of the dark by providing victims a confidential advisor that can help them through the reporting process. When reported, those involved with the investigations would be properly trained and hearings should be more likely to hold offenders accountable. Ideally, the culture created by these provisions in CASA will encourage victims to report incidents more prevalently, as they observe a system that helps them through the process, holds offenders accountable, and provides them with necessary services to recover from a traumatic event.

With the problem well established that campus sexual assaults are occurring at high rates but largely remaining in the dark, CASA has emerged as a potential solution within the policy stream. CASA seeks to increase transparency through an annual survey that would collect data on each college’s annual rate of sexual assault incidents. While the Clery Act relies on official record data, CASA would implement a government mandated climate survey at each federally funded college and university. Students would complete this climate survey answering questions about their history with campus sexual violence. Thus, this survey would gather data from both perpetrators and victims and provide a more accurate picture of the state of sexual violence on today’s college campuses. With increased transparency, schools would be incentivized to reduce rates of violence on their respective campus to help
improve these victimization statistics. It may also look bad for an institution if their official rates reported through Clery vary greatly from the climate survey reports, thus indicating potential issues with the reporting environment at that institution. Also, the change in financial penalties is seen as an improvement upon the Clery Act because it would hurt, but not shut down, an institution (Bahr, 2014; Marklein, 2014).

While supporters of the bill would emphasize the strength of these aforementioned solutions within the policy stream, critics of the bill have cited issues with CASA provisions. Some critics focus on the public database, which they perceive as a form of public shaming (Bahr, 2014). Due to a lack of staff at the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), concern has also arisen over the ability of OCR to enforce the policy through adequate investigations (Bahr, 2014). Critics are also concerned with a provision that would allow the agency that imposes the fine to keep it and use the funds for enforcing CASA provisions. This provision could encourage OCR to over pursue schools in order to collect funds for itself and possibly conduct ethically skewed investigations. Tasking untrained school administrators with investigating these criminal incidents is also an issue of concern (McElroy, 2014). Despite these criticisms, they do not negate the many strong solutions identified within the policy stream.

The politics stream is where CASA runs into the most trouble. In a national survey of college students, 32.3 percent of respondents supported a comprehensive, clear sexual assault policy (“Students Active for Ending Rape,” 2013). The increase of media coverage on campus sexual assaults may be indicative of the national mood shifting its attention to this long hidden issue. Media entities, such as Time Magazine, Rolling Stone Magazine, the New York Post, and the Washington Post, as well as top elected officials have begun
to devote increased attention to this issue. Whitehouse.Gov describes President Obama’s and Vice President Biden’s national efforts toward reducing collegiate sexual violence, including the formation of the “White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault” (“The White House”, 2014; Jarett, 2014).

Despite these positive movements, the recent midterm elections may be the biggest hindrance within this stream. When Congress recessed for the summer, the bill had not been placed on the agenda for September (Marklein, 2014). The November midterm elections brought political party turnover in the Senate. New congressional leadership seems eager to make changes and shift the policy agenda (Fahrentold, 2014). This shift is likely to leave CASA on the backburner, as it currently does not appear to be a leading policy concern. The new regime is focused upon taking action on issues such as the approval of the Keystone XL pipeline, passing a budget, the Affordable Care Act and immigration policy (Montgomery & Costa, 2014).

Despite campus sexual assault policies not headlining the new congressional leadership’s agenda, interest groups have not given up on CASA. In December the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) started a petition to urge the new leadership to focus upon these policies (Kingkade, 2014). If other interest groups, especially those with a strong footing such as SOC join this push, CASA could make its way onto the agenda and garner legitimate political debate.

According to Kingdon’s (1984) multiple-streams model, the problem stream has opened the policy window and a solution exists. However, the timing of the bill’s proposal hinders the political stream, and the seemingly inevitable agenda shift seems destined to leave this proposal behind. Without the
convergence of these three streams, the probability for enactment decreases (Kingdon, 1984). Despite the current negative outlook, hope may still be alive. It may take many political forces for the push to be strong enough for CASA to make its way onto the new leadership’s agenda. If CASA fails to survive congressional scrutiny, new leaders could propose other policy solutions to address campus sexual assaults. Since CASA is a bipartisan proposal, it could reasonably survive the leadership turnover if the appropriate political pushes are in place, or if a focusing event occurs soon that forces leaders to search for a policy solution.

POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF CASA

“Better policies would result, we are told, if policymakers would think about whether their decisions could be implemented before they settle on a course of action” (Elmore, 1979). While it is important to understand if a proposed bill will pass Congress, it is meaningless if that bill will not convert into legislation that can be properly implemented and meet its intended goals. Analyzing the potential implementation process of CASA is a valuable metric for demonstrating prospective success, which in turn may increase the political feasibility of the bill if political conditions become more favorable in the future. This implementation assessment takes a two-stage approach. The first stage analyzes implementation of CASA using a top-down approach guided by Birkland (2011) and Elmore’s (1979) work on forward mapping. Birkland (2011) recognizes that top-down approaches are more useful than bottom-up approaches for policy change of this nature. The second stage uses the Routine Activities Theory framework to evaluate the proposal’s ability to actually reduce campus crime.
The bill’s patrons argue that higher education institutions currently are encouraged to underreport sexual assaults. The goal of CASA is to incentivize schools to take proactive steps to protect their students and provide services to victims (McCaskill, 2014). In regards to policy tools, CASA would use law and regulation (Levine, Peters, and Thompson, 1990), authority tools (Schneider and Ingram, 1997), or directive power (Anderson, 2002) to compel higher education institutions to alter their behavior and comply with the legislation (Birkland, 2011).

CASA has a clear implementation chain. Once the bill is passed and signed, the ED will designate roles to administrators within its agency, educate schools on their new responsibilities under this law, and monitor compliance. From there, individual institutions will decide how they will handle these new demands (American Council on Education, 2012).

In terms of the capacity of implementers and weaknesses within the implementation chain, much can be learned from the implementation of the Clery Act. Numerous studies have found that most schools do not fully comply with the Clery Act (Kerr, 2001; Cohen, 2005). Failure to comply with the act has been attributed to financial constraints (McNeal, 2007), lack of guidance from the ED (Carter, 2002), and institutional reluctance to publish high crime statistics (Carter, 2002) because of fears of reputational harm (Griffaton, 1993). Learning from these lessons, the implementation of CASA would go much smoother if the ED assists university administrators in understanding proper compliance. Additional resources could also increase the capacity of ground-level implementers at individual institutions. These resources could come in the form of training seminars on how to assure institutional compliance and funding to help with implementation of the new demands this legislation creates.
Acquiring this funding will be difficult, but if Congress wants the bill to achieve its goals, it must assure that institutions will have the funding necessary for compliance.

While this approach provides clarity to the implementation of CASA, it has weaknesses. Elmore (1979) identified a weakness in top-down approaches’ assumption that “policymakers control the organizational, political, and technological processes that affect implementation.” Policymakers do not exercise direct control over policy implementation. In reality, agency administrators have a great deal of discretion in the policy implementation process. This discretion is legitimized by the fact that these administrators are largely appointed or directed by elected officials (Elmore, 1979). If these administrators use their discretion improperly, elected officials have the ability to replace these administrators with other individuals.

IMPLEMENTATION FRAMED BY ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY

The most frequently used theoretical framework to explain campus crime is Routine Activities Theory (RAT), which seeks to elucidate why all crime occurs, not sexual assaults specifically. Yet, this theory easily translates into a specific focus on sexual assaults. The theory is based on the premise that most crime requires the convergence of likely offenders and suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). College campuses allow these three entities to converge (Henson & Stone, 1999). Likely offenders are often within the surrounding community or student body, with a range of motivations to commit crime. Campuses contain suitable targets, with a wealth of young people on campus daily who bring valuable commodities with them. Inadequate capable guardians could range from parents’
absence, to inadequate campus police forces, to even students themselves, who are notoriously weak guardians as they tend to leave their rooms unlocked, come and go at all hours, and are generally inattentive to problems (Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte, 1995; Henson & Stone, 1999). The RAT framework will be used to analyze the potential success of CASA.

Most of CASA’s provisions address the capable guardians tenant of the RAT framework. The provisions dealing with confidential advisors, trained investigators and those in disciplinary hearings (McCaskill, 2014) illustrate this notion. These individuals could become capable guardians as advisors provide information to survivors about the appropriate channels for reporting. The advisors could also encourage victims to use their experience to educate others on how to reduce their potential for victimization, thus increasing future capable guardians. The trained individuals would then step in to assure that the investigation and disciplinary hearings are handled properly, increasing the likelihood that offenders are discovered, charged, and convicted or disciplined. The provisions that seek to centralize campus disciplinary proceedings (McCaskill, 2014) would help take these cases out of the hands of self-interested guardians, who may cater to the accused, and place them in the hands of independent, capable guardians.

While the provision dealing with the climate survey (McCaskill, 2014) does not specifically create capable guardians, it allows victims to report sexual assaults anonymously. This provides more accurate data on an institution’s sexual violence, and thus forces administrators to reduce the amount of sexual violence in order to maintain their public image. In order to take steps to reduce violence, schools could learn from RAT and increase the amount of capable guardians, reduce the motivated offenders, or seek to
minimize the suitability of campus members as targets (Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte, 1995). The provision that deals with the financial penalty (McCaskill, 2014) does not directly increase capable guardians, but it encourages schools to comply with the Act and reduce sexual assaults.

In terms of implementation, CASA has the ability to reduce campus sexual violence if implemented effectively. CASA has defined, measurable goals, with specific policy tools, an implementation chain, and an understanding of implementation capacity (Birkland, 2011). From a RAT perspective, each provision has the ability to reduce these crimes. It is important to note that in making some of these assumptions that provisions would increase capable guardians, leaps were taken, and in reality, some of these provisions may not increase that population. Another leap was based upon the idea that the ED, and more specifically the Office of Civil Rights, has the capacity to monitor compliance and enforce CASA. If they lack capacity to implement the Act, the bill should ensure that that proper expansions are made so that they are capable of monitoring and enforcing compliance. Despite these leaps, this bill could conceivably meet the bill’s original goal of reducing sexual violence on college campuses.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE CAMPUS SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

Since it appears that CASA is not likely to pass based on Kingdon’s (1984) model, the focus thus shifts to where this policy issue will go next. Advocacy groups have gained solid footing within this policy arena and will continue to advocate for their concerns. With indicators providing evidence of the rampant nature of college sexual violence, feedback on the failure of other policies, and solidified policy entrepreneurs in
place, the death of CASA would not mark the end of the search for policy solutions to curb collegiate sexual violence. A focusing event could open a policy window that would allow legislation like CASA to gain support. Many solutions within the policy stream focus on holding institutions accountable for underreporting, forcing institutions to properly handle victim reporting, finding ways for victims to feel comfortable reporting, providing services and support to survivors, and creating an environment that discourages sexual violence.

From these broad goals, a successful solution must meet several important criteria. It must incentivize schools to improve upon certain weaknesses without publicly shaming them (Bahr, 2014). Additionally, the financial penalties collected need to be enforced in a manner that does not encourage compliance agencies to over pursue institutions. At the same time, they must be large enough that a school would fear receiving the penalties, but not so large that the ED would never levy them. In order for a policy to be implemented successfully, it is important that key institutions and agencies have adequately trained staff in place to handle new burdens that result from the policy.

The biggest change within the three streams that must occur in order for a policy solution of this nature to pass is in the politics stream. If the public continues to be receptive to these policies and a specific solution emerges that meets the criteria discussed in the previous paragraph, it has the ability to make its way up the political agenda. Since campus sexual violence tends to be a bipartisan concern, a policy solution of this nature could make it through the new Congress and appease the current executive administration. Regardless of how the policy window emerges, well-positioned advocacy groups and
individuals must move fast in order for a policy solution to have a chance at enactment and implementation.

According to a Routine Activities Theory framework, CASA provisions have the potential to reduce campus crime, mostly by increasing capable guardians. A future policy solution could build upon these provisions and expand focus toward encouraging students to be better guardians themselves. While CASA would provide students with the statistics necessary to educate them on the safety of their campus, more specific steps could be established to help students translate this statistical knowledge into practices and habits that help make them better guardians. Schools could educate students on preventive measures such as traveling in groups, locking doors, and using a buddy system at parties. The sad part about having to focus on students protecting themselves is that it deals with the problem at a late stage. The ultimate focus should be on the source of the problem and how to prevent offenders from becoming motivated to commit the act. Deterrence may be ineffective because few victims report the incident to law enforcement, and the few that do report rarely see the assailant charged criminally (Kilpatrick, et al., 2007; Alderden & Ullman, 2012). Thus, the best way to prevent motivated offenders from arising would be programs that intervene at younger ages and seek to prevent individuals from developing into ones that think it is acceptable to exploit women.

While a focus on prevention is essential, the proper mechanisms need to be in place to help victims recover and encourage, but not mandate, reporting to either campus or law enforcement officials. In addition to the proposed confidential advisors, there must be a way that victims can remain anonymous so that they do not fear the public shame and embarrassment that result from reporting this type of incident.
Steps also need to be taken to help survivors feel confident that the person to whom they report the incident will take it seriously. Perhaps all schools should be mandated to have an individual trained in dealing with sexual assault victims, such as a social worker or counselor, on staff that handles the initial reports. Difficulties would arise since these individuals may not be experts in the legal nuances of the area, and schools may point to lack of resources as a hindrance to hiring individuals with this expertise.

While most of this analysis has focused upon federal level responses to campus sexual assaults, state legislatures could choose to intervene in this area if they feel that Congress has failed to adequately respond. In fact, some state legislatures argue that they are better suited to legislate in this area because they could serve as a laboratory to test policies. Another argument could be that colleges and universities vary widely. Since state governments work frequently with their states’ colleges, they are in a better position to tailor the legislation to fit their institutions (Weiser, 2001). It is difficult for Congress to tailor legislation that can be successfully applied to the diverse range of higher education institutions that exist in the US.

If CASA is not reintroduced and the new leadership in Congress does not put campus sexual assault on their agenda, states are likely to act. Prior to Congress’s passage of the Clery Act, many state legislators had begun to pass laws that forced university administrators to publicly report their campus crime statistics (Carter & Bath, 2007). States would likely take this course of action soon and begin passing legislation that forces colleges and universities to address sexual assault within their own campuses. Eventually the federal government is likely address campus sexual assaults
through legislation, but until then, states may take a proactive approach.

CONCLUSION

The high rate of campus sexual assaults is an issue that demands policy attention. While Congress has passed specific policy responses to address campus safety, and in particular campus sexual assaults, many important areas still need to be addressed. The Campus Safety and Accountability Act seeks to address these issues by making victimization rates at each institution publically accessible, providing support and services to victims, assuring that individuals that investigate and handle disciplinary hearings on these incidents are properly trained, and incentivizing administrators to seek ways to reduce sexual victimization rates in order to maintain a clean public image. Analysis using a Routine Activities Theory framework suggests CASA has the ability to reduce sexual violence if implemented correctly.

Despite this positive outlook, it appears that CASA is not likely to pass, as the recent change in congressional leadership has left the bill on the backburner, despite its bipartisan support. Future policy solutions within this realm should seek to capitalize upon the opening of a future policy window and build upon CASA to continue to seek ways to increase capable guardians on campus, while also looking for ways to make students less suitable targets. A future policy proposal should also seek long-term solutions that have the ability to reduce the amount of motivated offenders. These solutions are more difficult as they deal with either improving deterrence or establishing intervention techniques that can prevent young males from developing a mindset that allows for the sexual exploitation of women. While a comprehensive policy solution may be difficult to establish, it is absolutely
necessary to assure that college women can experience higher education without the fear of being sexually victimized.

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