Brie Gertler

Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies
Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia
Book Symposia Editor, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
gertler@virginia.edu

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Research Interests: Philosophy of Mind — especially self-knowledge, consciousness, and mental content.

Full CV is here.

Appearance on Philosophy TV discussing introspection with Eric Schwitzgebel

Appearance on Philosophy TV discussing knowledge of one’s own beliefs with Alex Byrne

Books

Self-Knowledge (2011). In Routledge’s New Problems in Philosophy series.  A detailed outline of the book is here.

Arguing About the Mind (2007), co-edited with Lawrence Shapiro. Routledge.

 

 

 

 

Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (2003), editor. In Ashgate’s Epistemology and Mind Series. Includes new papers by Murat Aydede, Dorit Bar-On and Douglas Long, José Luis Bermúdez, Fred Dretske, Joseph Levine, William Lycan, Charles Siewert, Ernest Sosa, and me; reprints 6 seminal articles on self-knowledge. Here is the Introduction. Here is an online review.

In Progress

Mental Individualism (working title), MS in progress.

“Observational Self-Knowledge and the Demands of Rational Agency”

Articles

• Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker?  Forthcoming (2012) in Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind, pp 51-75.

• “Renewed Acquaintance”. (2012) In Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar. Oxford University Press.

• “Conscious States as Objects of Awareness”. (2012) In Philosophical Studies symposium on Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective Consciousness (Oxford 2009).

• “Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief”. (2011) In Self-Knowledge, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis. Oxford University Press.

• “The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness”. Critical notice of Daniel Stoljar (2009) Ignorance and Imagination: the epistemic origin of the problem of consciousness. Noûs 43: 378-93.

• “Introspection”. (2009) In The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. (Bayne, Cleeremans and Wilken, eds.)

• “Self-Knowledge”. (2008) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Revised and expanded from 2003 original version.)

• “Tienson’s Challenge to Content Externalism”. (2007) The Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference 2006).

• “Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self”.  (2007) Philosophical Issues 17: 37-56.

• “Overextending the Mind?” (2007) In Arguing about the Mind.

• “In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism”. (2007) In Reason and Responsibility, 13th edition. Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, eds. (Wadsworth).

Reprinted (2011) in Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell, eds., Consciousness and the Mind Body Problem: A Reader. Oxford University Press.

• “Consciousness and Qualia Cannot be Reduced.” (2006) In Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Robert Stainton, ed. (Blackwell).

• “The Knowledge Argument”. (2005) In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. (Macmillan)

• “We can’t know a priori that H₂O exists. But can we know that water does?” (2004) Analysis 64: 44-7.

• “Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds”. (2004) Protosociology 20.

• “How to Draw Ontological Conclusions from Introspective Data”. (2003) In Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge.

• “Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind”. (2002) Noûs 36: 22-49.

• “Can Feminists be Cartesians?” (2002) Dialogue 41: 91-112.

• “The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge”. (2002) Philosophical Topics 28: 125-46.

• “Metaphysics”. (2002) in the Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Macmillan Publishing).

• “Introspecting Phenomenal States”. (2001) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 305-28.

• “The Relationship between Phenomenality and Intentionality”, (2001) comment on C. Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (17)

• “The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion”. (2001) Mind 110: 689-94.

• “Functionalism’s Methodological Predicament”. (2000) The Southern Journal of Philosophy38: 77-94.

• “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument”. (1999) Philosophical Studies 93: 317-36.

Book Reviews

• Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject’s Point of View. (2009) Philosophical Quarterly 59: 743-47.
• Review of Roessler and Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. (2004) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
• Review of John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. (2002) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, inaugural issue.
• Review of Andre Gallois, The World Without, The Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. (2000) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 235-8.
• Review of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. (1999) Ethics 110: 202-5.
• Review of W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience. (1998) Mind107: 676-9.

Employment

University of Virginia, Associate Professor, 2004-present.
University of Wisconsin – Madison, Associate Professor, 2004-2005. (leave of absence)
University of Wisconsin – Madison, Assistant Professor, 2001-2004.
College of William and Mary, Assistant Professor, 1997-2001.

Education

Brown University, Ph.D., Philosophy, June 1997. Dissertation: An Introspectivist View of the Mental.
University of Pennsylvania, M.A., Philosophy, June 1992.
Swarthmore College, B.A. with High Honors, Philosophy, June 1989.